Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 1

Article

2011

Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of
Czars and Congressional Oversight
Kenneth A. Klukowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and
Congressional Oversight , 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 31 (2011)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK: A
MULTI-FACTOR TEST IN AN AGE OF CZARS AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
KENNETH A. KLUKOWSKI*

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 32
II. CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IMPLICATE EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE.............................................................................. 34
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE FOR EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE.............................................................................. 37
A. Collision of Constitutional Forces Between Coequal
Political Branches ......................................................... 39
1. Congressional Oversight ........................................ 39
2. Executive Power of the President........................... 44
3. Executive Privilege Is Necessary at the
Intersection of Separated Powers ........................... 46
B. The Rationale and Legal Theory for Executive
Privilege......................................................................... 49
IV. CURRENT EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE ......................... 52
A. Contextual Observations ............................................... 53
B. The United States v. Nixon Balancing Test and Modern
Procedure ...................................................................... 54
1. What Is Protected by the Current Rule................... 54
2. What Is (or May Be) Unprotected Under This
Rule ........................................................................ 59
C. Unanswered Questions Regarding Enumerated Powers
such as Appointment Power .......................................... 60
1. Exploring Unresolved Questions............................ 60
2. Presidential Appointment Power............................ 62
D. The Courts Should Adopt a Multi-Factor Test for
Interbranch Executive Privilege Cases ......................... 66
1. Office Created by Congress ................................... 67
*

Research Fellow, Liberty University School of Law; Fellow and Senior Legal Analyst,
American Civil Rights Union; National-Bestselling Author. George Mason University School
of Law, J.D. 2008; University of Notre Dame, B.B.A. 1998. The author wishes to thank
Professor Nathan A. Sales of George Mason for his thoughtful help and advice, as well as
Amanda J. Klukowski, Chase E. Klukowski, and Nelson Lund. This Article is dedicated to
Caleb A. Klukowski.

31

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

1

32

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:31

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Policymaking.......................................................... 67
Extra-White House Origins .................................... 68
Textual Commitment in the Constitution............... 69
Presidential Involvement ........................................ 70
Nature of Other Actors ........................................... 70
Czars....................................................................... 72
V. COURTS SHOULD REFUSE BOTH RECENTLY-OFFERED
SOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH ........ 73
A. Courts Should Reject Both Proposed Arguments .......... 74
1. Congressional Arguments ...................................... 74
2. White House Arguments ........................................ 75
B. Superior Alternative Approach for the Recent
Controversies................................................................. 77
C. All Three Government Branches—Including Congress—
Will Benefit from not Allowing Congress to Be Involved
with Executive Branch Appointment Decisions............. 80
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 83

I. INTRODUCTION
Political gridlock sometimes forces the federal judiciary to resolve a number of
disputes between the other two branches of government. When held by opposite
parties, Congress and the White House occasionally engage in political battles that
turn on questions of law, and therefore spill over into the courts. Eventually, these
conflicts between the political branches force the judicial branch to revisit its
doctrine of executive privilege, exploring uncharted constitutional waters. As recent
years have often seen a President of one party and Congress held by the opposition
party, an examination of executive privilege doctrine proves timely and useful to the
judiciary.
Executive privilege conflicts are almost unavoidable in times of heightened
partisan conflict. Congressional oversight of the executive has been part of
American constitutional government since George Washington. Congress requires
information to perform its constitutional oversight role when formulating legislation
and in order to responsibly appropriate funds for current and ongoing government
operations. Concurrently, the President must withhold certain information to
properly execute his constitutional duties, given that disclosure of some information
would harm the national interest. All other information, however, should be
divulged in a free and open society where the government answers to the people.
When information is sought through compulsory means, either by Congress or the
courts, executive privilege is the doctrine that shields sensitive information from
disclosure to protect the nation’s interests, while assuring the disclosure of the
remainder.
In the past eighteen years, opposition Congresses controlled by both parties have
aggressively investigated the White House. In the 1990s, the Republican Congress
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investigated Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton on myriad issues,
culminating in the impeachment of a sitting President when President Clinton lied
under oath in answering questions regarding his personal life, questions of an
admittedly embarrassing nature. In subsequent years, a Democratic Congress
investigated Republican President George W. Bush on matters at the core of the
President’s constitutional powers. Several U.S. attorneys—political appointees that
serve at the pleasure of the President—were replaced by the White House. Two
committees in the House of Representatives and one committee in the Senate
investigated this and other matters, demanding to know what the President of the
United States discussed privately with his immediate advisers about these decisions
involving the President’s appointment power. These committees subpoenaed three
senior presidential aides in the White House—as well as the attorney general—to
obtain information regarding these presidential conversations. The President
asserted executive privilege to prevent the disclosure of these conversations, and
several of these matters subsequently went before the courts.
The presidency of Barack Obama is proving at least as contentious as its two
immediate predecessors. Republicans lacked the legal authority to subpoena
administration officials during 2009 and 2010—a consequence of being in the
minority in both chambers of Congress. Republicans, however, won 63 House seats
in the 2010 midterm elections, thereby regaining majority status in the House, with
committee chairmanships and compulsory power attending that status. (This could
likewise be the case after the next election, possibly with the Senate as well.) With
this changing of the guard, the nation may well again witness political
brinksmanship over access to information involving the President and his
subordinates.
This conflict over information has been building for decades. Fourteen years
ago, one writer noted that “[o]ver the past two decades, Congress and the President
have engaged in increasingly bitter constitutional warfare over access to information.
Two implicit constitutional doctrines have collided in these episodes: executive
privilege and congressional investigatory power.”1 The situation has only become
more acrimonious and adversarial in subsequent years. The Constitution empowers
Congress to engage in vigorous oversight actions over legislative matters and also
over executive actions performed by, or involving, congressionally-created offices
and Senate-confirmed officers. The Constitution also contemplates an energetic and
independent chief executive, separate and distinct from Congress, and entitled to
private deliberations within the White House on the President’s performance of his
constitutional duties and exercise of those powers textually committed to him.
Recent years have upset this interbranch balance of powers, muddying the
constitutional waters and unmooring current practice from the Framers’ design.
Therefore, a clear ruling on the applicability of executive privilege would be helpful
to clarify the proper boundaries of legislative oversight and restore normative
interbranch relations.

1
Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative
of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 632 (1997); accord Stephen C. N. Lilley,
Suboptimal Executive Privilege, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2009) (“Few separation of
powers issues have been as consistently contentious over the last fifty years as the existence,
scope, and proper use of executive privilege . . . .”).
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The courts must resolve such controversies when properly presented in an Article
III context. Leaving conflicts unresolved only results in additional litigation and
political gridlock. It is exceedingly difficult for a court to formulate and apply
standards to resolve clashes between the political branches.2 Yet, when the political
branches reach an impasse in a situation that turns on a question of constitutional
law, the courts should resolve the issue if properly presented in a justiciable case
once these issues reach a tipping point. Indeed, when the courts refuse to engage in
a controversy wherein jurisdiction is proper out of a reluctance to become enmeshed
in a political matter, that too threatens the courts’ legitimacy by giving the
appearance of a dereliction of duty.3 The judiciary should find that executive
privilege bars Congress from compelling testimony from senior presidential advisers
in the White House regarding their conversations with the President concerning the
President’s use of a power explicitly granted to him in the text of the Constitution.
But the Court must not allow so-called “czars” in the White House to enjoy any
confidentiality not afforded to Senate-confirmed department officers, when those
“czars” exercise anything resembling operational management of government
activities. Allowing Congress to force disclosure when executive privilege properly
applies violates the separation of powers, and therefore, the Constitution protects the
confidentiality of such conversations. But allowing the President to refuse
disclosure when helpful for proper oversight likewise violates the separation of
powers, and therefore, the Constitution does not countenance such refusals. A
decision delineating this distinction should improve interbranch relations by
clarifying each branch’s constitutional role.
This Article begins in Part II by exploring a recent executive privilege case
between the White House and Congress. Part III then explains the constitutional
rationale for executive privilege by surveying the tension between Congress’s
Article I powers and the President’s Article II powers. Part IV then explains modern
executive privilege doctrine and the different forms of executive privilege, and also
proposes a new multi-factor analysis to be incorporated into the current test. Part V
moreover explains why the courts should reject both branches’ arguments on these
issues in favor of a third approach. Part VI then ends with the long-term
implications of executive privilege.
II. CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IMPLICATE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
When the White House and Congress are held by opposite parties, conflicts can
erupt over access to information. One such recent conflict resulted in litigation
against two former officials serving under President George W. Bush—White House
Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten.
In 2006, the Justice Department requested and received the resignations of nine
U.S. attorneys.4 The House Committee on the Judiciary began an investigation into
the replacing of these prosecutors,5 alleging that replacing these prosecutors seemed

2

United States v. AT&T (AT&T I), 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

3

See Lilley, supra note 1, at 1160-61.

4

Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2008).

5

Id. at 55, 57.
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suspicious.6 In doing so, they began seeking documents and testimony from officials
at the White House, including senior White House staff who communicate directly
with the President of the United States.7 The White House offered documents
containing communications between presidential advisers, the Justice Department,
and also between those advisers and congressional members and staffers.8 Rejecting
these, the Judiciary Committee made clear that it sought internal White House
communications involving the President.9 The Committee Chairman John Conyers
and the relevant Subcommittee Chair Linda Sanchez began a series of demand letters
to which White House Counsel Fred Fielding, writing for President George W.
Bush, repeatedly refused to allow senior aides in the White House to testify under
oath before the Committee.10 Although each side offered various accommodations,
neither found the other’s offers acceptable.11
After the last offer and counteroffer were rejected, the committee subpoenaed
Miers and Bolten for information regarding replacing the U.S. attorneys in
question.12 Acting Attorney General (and Solicitor General) Paul Clement, as well
as the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, both advised the President that
these testimony and documents were protected by executive privilege.13 The
President then asserted executive privilege, directing Miers and Bolten not to comply
with the subpoenas.14
The House Judiciary Committee voted to hold Joshua Bolten and Harriet Miers
in contempt for refusing to testify, and formally reported the matter to the full House
for action.15 The full House voted to hold Bolten and Miers in contempt of
Congress, and authorized the House Judiciary Committee, under Chairman John
Conyers, to file a civil suit on behalf of the House to seek a federal court to order
Bolten and Miers to comply with the House subpoena.16 Speaker Nancy Pelosi then
certified that result pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194, referring the contempt citation to the
6
Id. at 57. During the course of this investigation, over 7,850 pages of information was
provided to the committee, and a number of administration officials testified. See id. at 58-59.
The committee found the testimony of several officials, such as former Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, to be inconsistent, and investigated further. Id. at 59.
7

Id. at 61-62.

8

Id. at 60 (citing Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 5).

9

Id.

10

Id. at 59-61.

11

See id.

12

Id. at 61. On June 13, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee issued subpoenas to White
House Counsel Harriet Miers to produce documents and offer sworn testimony regarding
replacing the U.S. attorneys, and to White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to provide any
such documents in his possession. Id.
13

Id. at 61-62.

14

Id. at 62.

15

Id. at 63; H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 1 (2007).

16

H.R. Res. 979, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 982,
110th Cong. (2008).
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U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for criminal prosecution.17 Attorney
General Michael Mukasey replied to Speaker Pelosi that he found the assertion of
executive privilege proper, and therefore, he would not have the U.S. attorney bring
prosecutions.18 The House, through Chairman Conyers, then filed suit pursuant to a
House Resolution passed concurrently with the contempt citations.19 The parties
then presented the executive privilege in their respective pleadings to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia,20 where Judge Bates denied the motion to
dismiss and allowed the suit to move forward on July 31, 2008.21
Although the question of standing will be addressed in more detail later, the
district court in Miers found that Congress has standing.22 The Miers court found
that Congress filed suit to vindicate both its right to information and its right to have
subpoenas enforced,23 and that either of these grounds satisfies the injury-in-fact
requirement for standing.24 The district court therefore proceeded to the merits of
the case, and the D.C. Circuit is likely to do the same both in this case and in
additional cases should they be brought. Such holdings carry sufficient promise that
increased litigation and corresponding assertions of executive privilege are likely
features of congressional oversight for the foreseeable future. Therefore, examining
the meaning and application of executive privilege is timely and helpful.
Other situations from the previous administration either resulted in, or at least
contemplated, litigation. There was an investigation involving former White House
Senior Adviser Karl Rove, concerning the same circumstances as the Miers/Bolten
situation, that led to congressional subpoenas and contempt proceedings.25 Another
situation involved former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, in which the
identity of a Central Intelligence Agency employee, Valerie Plame, was made public
17
Under federal statute, the Speaker of the House certifies a contempt citation to the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Columbia, “whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the
grand jury for its action.” 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2006).
18
Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author).
19

H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008).

20
Mem. of Points & Auths. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Comm. on the
Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00409); Mem. of Points &
Auths. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss & in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. on
Counts I & II, Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (No. 1:08-cv-00409).
21

Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 108.

22

Id. at 78.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

This Senate Judiciary Committee subpoenaed Rove to testify regarding the same U.S.
attorney situation. See Paul Kane, Rove, Bolten Found in Contempt of Congress, WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007
121301736.html. Once again, President Bush asserted executive privilege, and the committee
voted to hold Rove in contempt and refer the matter to the full U.S. Senate on December 13,
2007. Id. The House Judiciary Committee later voted to act likewise and referred the matter
to the full House on July 30, 2008. Associated Press, Rove could be held in contempt of
Congress, MSNBC.COM, July 30, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25932226/.
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by a newspaper story discussing pre-war intelligence on Iraq.26 The investigation
that followed resulted in a criminal conviction,27 though the prison sentenced for that
conviction was commuted28 and the civil suit arising from these facts was
dismissed.29 The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, through
Chairman Henry Waxman sought documents regarding this disclosure,30
subpoenaing Justice Department records of interviews with President George W.
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney discussing the matter.31 Executive privilege
was asserted regarding those documents, and so Mukasey refused to deliver them to
the committee.32 The House Judiciary Committee consequently considered holding
Attorney General Mukasey in contempt of Congress and referring the matter to the
full House.33
With these and future situations, one investigative duration should also be noted.
The House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuous body.34 House subpoenas,
therefore, expire on January 3 of every odd-numbered year when a new Congress is
called into session following each congressional election. Senate subpoenas, by
contrast, do not expire. Also, although a President can continue to assert executive
privilege after he leaves office,35 the vitality of that privilege lessens at that time.36
The case law does not explain precisely what the limits of that privilege then
become.

26

See Robert Novak, Editorial, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003, at

31.
27
Chief of Staff to the Vice President Scooter Libby was convicted for, inter alia, perjury
and obstruction of justice on March 6, 2007. United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2
(D.D.C. 2007).
28
Libby’s prison sentence was commuted by President George W. Bush. United States v.
Libby, 495 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2007).
29
Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’g 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C.
2007) (dismissing the case).
30

Jason Ryan, Attorney General Threatened with Contempt of Congress over CIA Leak
Documents, ABCNEWS.COM, July 8, 2008, http://www.abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5
333956.
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

See 154 CONG. REC. D1134-35 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2008). All of these incidents were
also cited in a resolution seeking the impeachment of the former President. See H.R. Res.
1258, 110th Cong., art. XXVII (2008).
34

AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

35

See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (“[Executive] privilege
survives the individual President’s tenure.”). One author argues that executive privilege
should not outlast a president’s term. See Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and
Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. REV. 301, 304 (2009).
36

See Sacharoff, supra note 35, at 305.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE FOR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Executive privilege is necessary to the tripartite system of American
constitutional government. Both of the political branches—the legislative and the
executive—are vested with broad powers.37 Having separate, coequal branches, at
times elected by different parties with different—even incompatible and sometimes
adverse—agendas inevitably causes clashes between separate actors that nonetheless
must interface and work together on a daily basis for the federal government to
function. But this process can be slow. “The Separation of Powers often impairs
efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is
the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual
accommodation required by the Separation of Powers.”38 Thus, it is expected that
the two political branches will at times come into conflict, and a way to resolve the
conflict is needed.
When such conflicts concern information, executive privilege becomes an issue.
Both legislative action and executive action require information. The executive is in
a superior position to obtain that information, as there is a military and intelligence
apparatus serving under the President that is essential to dealing effectively with—
and being prepared for—the dangers that any nation faces in an imperfect world.39
The origins of executive privilege in the United States can be traced to the
founding of the republic, and has continued to the present day. President
Washington made clear in 1792 that he reserved the right to withhold from Congress
his cabinet deliberations when considering how to respond to the failed efforts of a
military action led by Major General St. Clair in Ohio.40 Washington then asserted
executive privilege again in refusing to disclose details regarding the formulation of
the Jay Treaty.41 Shortly thereafter in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
stated that the cabinet official whose actions were being examined (Secretary of
State James Madison) did not need to disclose anything confidentially
communicated to him by the President,42 although the Court went on to find that the
known facts of the Marbury case were clearly not of a confidential nature.43 Every
President since Dwight D. Eisenhower has asserted executive privilege to varying
extents, or at minimum taken efforts to express that he retains the right to assert it.44
37

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

38

United States v. AT&T (AT&T II), 567 F.2d 121, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

39

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936)
(dictum).
40

Lilley, supra note 1, at 1133 (citing LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS
PRIVILEGE 10-11 (2004)).

OF

EXECUTIVE

41

Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320-21 (dictum); see also FISHER, supra note 40, at 35-36.

42

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 144-45 (1803) (dictum).

43

Id. at 144, 170 (dictum). At issue in Marbury was the failure of the Secretary of State to
deliver a signed copy of a D.C. municipal judicial commission to William Marbury. Id. at
138-39.
44

Lilley, supra note 1, at 1133-34 & nn.13-20 (citing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 41, 54-119, 122, 14754 (2d ed. 2002)).
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“The essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned sphere of
responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other
branches.”45
This does not mean that Congress is powerless to obtain information. There are
certainly other tools that Congress can utilize in attempting to motivate the executive
to divulge information. The power to withhold confirmations of presidential
nominations is one of the most obvious examples, but that power is wielded only by
the Senate.46 The primary tool the House has to encourage executive cooperation is
the appropriations process. While one may assume that this power was never
intended to be used to relentlessly badger or coerce the executive branch, there is
evidence from the time of the Framing that the power of the purse was always
intended as a powerful tool in interbranch relations.47 Requesting or demanding
information is only one option open to Congress as it seeks to fulfill its oversight
responsibility, and executive privilege is the counterweight to that in our
constitutional framework.
A. Collision of Constitutional Forces Between Coequal Political Branches
The allocation of powers between separate and coequal branches predictably
causes challenges. Congress regularly holds hearings to conduct oversight of
executive branch agencies. This oversight consists of probing how the President’s
executive power is being exercised in those departments and agencies.
Congressional hearings are designed to elicit information. Some of that information
from the executive is of a nature that the executive seeks to keep confidential, and
the D.C. Circuit has held that there is a “‘great public interest’” in safeguarding the
confidentiality of the President’s conversations concerning his official duties.48
Thus, executive privilege must accommodate the legitimate needs that both branches
have regarding information, recognizing “the fundamental constitutional principle
that ‘[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in
the President.’”49
1. Congressional Oversight
Much of the confusion over the scope of executive privilege proceeds from the
ambiguous nature of congressional oversight. Congressional investigations have
been part of American government since 1792.50 With the exception of certain
enumerated quasi-executive functions of the Senate such as confirmations,51 the only
45

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61 (1982).

46

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

47

E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).

48

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 72930 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
49
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)).
50

Matthew Mantel, Congressional Investigations: A Bibliography, 100 LAW LIBR. J. 323,
324 n.8 (2008).
51

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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clear purpose of the legislative branch is to legislate.52 Yet, there is some historical
support for the argument that Congress has an investigative role beyond its strictly
legislative function. George Mason made the comment that members of Congress
“possess inquisitorial power[] . . . to inspect the Conduct of the public offices”53
beyond their role as legislators. And a century later Woodrow Wilson argued that
“[q]uite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.”54 The
Supreme Court resolved this issue when it declared that Congress has a
constitutional power to conduct oversight of the executive branch,55 as “the power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.”56 Otherwise stated:
[F]or Congress to be able effectively to perform any of its functions—
ranging from legislating, to overseeing administrative agencies, to
impeaching, to judging the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members—it must have access to information. If those in possession of
the necessary information could not be made to give it up, then Congress
would have at its disposal only the information that witnesses wanted it to
have—hardly an effective means of carrying out its functions.57
A great deal of oversight hearings are essentially supervisory in nature, rather
than in contemplation of possible legislation. Even if the Senate properly has a
supervisory power incidental to its confirmation power, there is no such justification
regarding the House. Although some could argue that Congress has a legitimate role
in ensuring that legislation is properly implemented,58 there is no explicit textual
basis in the Constitution for such an argument, and in fact the constitutional text
speaks against this by charging the President—not Congress—with taking care that
the laws are properly executed.59 If Congress is overseeing with a watchful eye to
consider whether remedial legislation is warranted, such a motivation would be
within the legislative ambit of Article I. But if a House committee readily
acknowledges that it is not exploring possible legislation, then, except for the
appropriations power discussed below, there is no constitutional foundation for such
hearings absent an inherent interrogatory power.
52

See id. art. I, § 1.

53

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).

54

WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY
297 (The Riverside Press 1901) (1885).
55

See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

56

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).

IN

AMERICAN POLITICS

57

Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 114344 (2009) (footnote omitted).
58
There are statutes that suggest Congress has such a legally-cognizable interest. See,
e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006) (granting the Senate a right to intervene in litigation “in which
the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are
placed in issue”). This would also explain why, when the Attorney General decides to
discontinue or refrain from defending the constitutionality of an act of Congress in litigation,
the Attorney General must inform Congress of that decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006).
59

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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“Congress’s power to monitor executive actions is implicit in the appropriations
power.”60 While it is perhaps reasonable that the Appropriations Committee would
hold hearings on a regular basis to assess the monetary resources it wished to
allocate to a given agency, it is unclear what role committee hearings play in the
constitutional process aside from that. But the question of what information
Congress is entitled to begs the question of where the constitutional contours of
oversight lie. How much is required or suggested by the Constitution, versus what
has simply become accepted practice over time? Although longstanding practice is
not the touchstone of constitutionality,61 the ubiquity of congressional oversight
since the Framing strongly suggests that it was contemplated as part of the
constitutional design. While constitutional silence on oversight (again, beyond the
implications of appropriations) leaves a great deal of ambiguity, sufficient authority
exists to form a cogent constitutional doctrine.
Congressional investigations have an essential role in the tripartite system of
government to hold the government accountable to the people through its elected
representatives. Congress is the “grand inquest of the state.”62 This inquest is held
in the form of hearings. The Supreme Court has held that “the constitutional
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses [of Congress] are
intended to include [oversight inquiries] to the end that the function may be
effectively exercised.”63 This information-gathering process is necessary because
“the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.”64 Of particular interest in the current situation,
it should be noted that if Congress finds a person in contempt, it actually has the
power to order its Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest and physically incarcerate that
person.65 It has never attempted to utilize that statute to arrest a White House
official.66 The prospect of doing so has been called “unseemly,”67 which is a bit of
an understatement, as it may be unconstitutional.68
The courts have found a constitutional foundation to oversight apart from the
appropriations process. Congress’s subpoena power is partially derived from the
Speech or Debate Clause.69 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that in the Eastland
case the Supreme Court held that the Speech and Debate Clause forbids courts from
60

AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

61

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (finding that a practice maintained
since the Framing, while evidence of constitutionality, is not dispositive).
62

1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 415 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).

63

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).

64

Id. at 174.

65

E.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).

66

Resp. to Cong. Requests for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Counsel
Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 86 (1986).
67

Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 78 (D.D.C. 2008).

68

See id.

69

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.”).
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interfering with congressional subpoenas if those subpoenas concern a legitimate
area of congressional investigation.70 But the circuit court then reasoned that
“Eastland immunity is not absolute in the context of a conflicting constitutional
interest asserted by a coordinate branch of the government,”71 noting that the
Supreme Court had previously stated in dictum that congressional subpoenas are not
enforceable if there is a “‘need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national
security secrets.’”72 The court then qualified that statement, stating that “[a]lthough
Congress may delegate its investigatory and subpoenaing power to its committees
and subcommittees, the assertion of this power against an executive claim of
excessive risk to national security is clearly stronger when ratified by a similar
plenary vote of the House.”73
This necessity for investigations includes congressional hearings for the
Department of Justice and its functionaries.
The Court has stated that
“administration of the Department of Justice—whether its functions were being
properly discharged or were being neglected or misdirected . . . [is] one on which
legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which
[Congress’s] investigation [can provide].”74 Legislation is annually enacted for the
Justice Department, and therefore, oversight hearings for the Department are not
only permissible, they are necessary for good government.
It goes without saying that congressional oversight would be a farce without
information. Congress starts at a disadvantage; the executive branch has all of the
information regarding its operations, and those with the information answer to
superior executive branch officials in upward lines of authority that eventually end
with the President. Every President understands that the less scrutiny administrative
action receives from a coequal branch, the more freedom the President has to act;
oversight creates political pressures that constrain the President’s actions.
Therefore, Congress’s subpoena power is essential to oversight. Thus:
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress
in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It
is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the
dignity of the Congress and its committees and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the province of proper investigation.75
So it was understood long before Watergate that congressional subpoenas are
sometimes the most effective instrument for Congress to fulfill its oversight duties.
As the district court in Miers stated, “[s]o long as the Committee is investigating a
matter on which Congress can ultimately propose and enact legislation, the
Committee may issue subpoenas in furtherance of its power of inquiry.”76
70
AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)).
71

Id.

72

Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)).

73

Id. at 393 n.16.

74

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927).

75

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957).

76

Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 77 (D.D.C. 2008).
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There are of course limits to what Congress can do in seeking to obtain
information. Congress cannot violate constitutional principles in seeking testimony
from witnesses.77 The limits on congressional power to seek information through
compulsory means must therefore be carefully examined because “a congressional
committee’s right to inquire is ‘subject to’ all relevant ‘limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action.’”78 The Bill of Rights provides some of those
limits,79 but those are in the context of Congress investigating a private individual,80
and therefore do not apply to congressional oversight of administration personnel
regarding their official activities.
Beyond limits to the procedures and tactics that Congress may employ, there are
also limits to the proper scope of congressional investigations. The Supreme Court
has found that “[a]lthough [Congress’s] power to investigate is necessarily broad it is
not unlimited.”81 Article I does not vest Congress with a right to obtain information
per se, “but rather merely establishes the general power to perform Congress’s
legislative function.”82
Conversely, a “generalized interest of presidential
confidentiality, without more, [does not preclude] discovery of presidential
conversations in civil litigation.”83 That is to say, the Constitution grants Congress
only “such limited power of inquiry” to aid in its legislative function.84 Thus,
inquiries unnecessary for legislative action are not constitutionally founded.85 It
must be kept in mind that Congress, no different from any governmental entity, can
succumb to the temptation to exercise power beyond its right to investigate matters
that lie outside its purview.
For example, the Senate committee at the heart of the litigation during Watergate
was expressly created by the Senate to investigate “illegal, improper or unethical
activities” concerning the 1972 presidential election to determine whether new
legislation was needed to protect the integrity of the process for future elections.86
There was thus an explicit legislative goal in the oversight process. It was not
simply inquiring.87

77

Watkins, 354 U.S. at 188.

78

Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 610 (1962) (quoting Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959)).
79

Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 164-65 (1955).

80

See id. at 157-58.

81

Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975).

82

Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2008).

83

Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

84

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).

85

See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959).

86

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d. 725, 726
& n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong. § 1(a) (1973)).
87
It would be naïve to suggest, however, that Congress is above using a contemplation-oflegislation rationale as a pretext to delve into executive affairs. It is not possible to remove
politics from political bodies.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

13

44

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:31

Those seeking to compel testimony could broadly argue that the Supreme Court
has stated that the power to compel witnesses is “necessary to the effective
functioning of [our] courts and legislatures,”88 as the Miers district court noted.89
But that statement proves too much. It is a simply a statement of general principle—
an axiom—that being able to get truthful information is, as a general matter,
essential to our governmental processes. But the controversies involving executive
privilege are about how to balance legitimate needs for information with the
President’s legitimate need to candidly discuss official matters with those assigned
to advise him.
2. Executive Power of the President
The executive power of the federal government is vested in the President,90 and
this provides the counterweight to congressional power that necessitates executive
privilege. The concept of inherent executive power is necessarily difficult to define,
leading many to suggest theories of how courts can fashion rules to evaluate
assertions predicated on such inherent constitutional authority,91 which is part of the
foundation of executive privilege.92 Although “[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is
there any explicit reference to a[n executive] privilege of confidentiality, yet to the
extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is
constitutionally based.”93
This is because of the President’s need to obtain information and expertise that
he does not personally possess, a need due to the complexity and variety of national
policy issues the President must consider. A modern President must make decisions
ranging from diplomatic relations with various nations, to military matters, to
national security threats, to domestic concerns from taxes, to education, to the
environment, to healthcare. For all these concerns, the President requires expert
advice. “The President . . . must make decisions relying substantially, if not entirely,
on the information and analysis supplied by advisers.”94
It necessarily follows that the President’s ability to confer with his senior
advisers “is surely an important condition to the exercise of executive power.”95 The
President must be able to assess the wisdom (or lack thereof) of proposed legislation
88

United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).

89

Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 99 (D.D.C. 2008).

90

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

91

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a
Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 887-95 (1983).
92

It should be noted, however, that some disagree on whether this executive power is
divisible, removing some of it from the exclusive control of the President. Compare Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing in favor of a unitary executive), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing against
a unitary executive). See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-718, 727-34 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a unitary executive).
93

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).

94

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

95

Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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when deciding whether to sign or to veto,96 and for existing law he must take care
that those laws are faithfully executed.97 If the President must act, and such actions
necessarily rely on expert advice, then the power to consult is concomitant with the
power to execute.
There is a clear analogue with Congress. The Supreme Court has held that the
protections members of Congress enjoy regarding their immunity from liability or
legal process for things said in the course of their official legislative deliberations
extend to their staffs.98 It must be acknowledged that congressional members have
the express protection of the Speech and Debate Clause,99 while there is no
corresponding provision in Article II for the President. But this does not negatively
imply that no such protection exists, because Article I enumerates the powers and
limitations of Congress with great particularity, while Article II sets forth broad
grants of authority without as much detailed specification. This is to be expected if
the Framers shared the view expressed in The Federalist that Congress is the branch
of the federal government most perilous to freedom,100 in that it becomes all the
more important to then commit congressional limits to writing.101 And so the lack of
such a clause in Article II does not imply that the protection for legislators just
mentioned does not exist for the executive, or for that matter, the courts. And
indeed, the courts do enjoy protection very similar to that enjoyed by members of
Congress.102
Those seeking broad congressional oversight of the President may quote Justice
Jackson’s statements that:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject.103
It is important, however, not to take Jackson’s statements too far beyond the facts he
was considering. In Youngstown, President Truman had ordered the federal
government to take control of the nation’s steel manufacturing facilities and did so
96

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.

97

Id. art. II, § 3.

98

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).

99

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

100

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (“[I]n a representative republic . . . it is
against the enterprising ambition of this [branch of government] that the people ought to
indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”).
101

This sentiment of the danger of congressional power further undercuts the argument that
executive privilege disputes should always be resolved in Congress’s favor, rather than be
adjudicated.
102

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

103

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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without congressional authorization.104 The Court was dealing with the President
making national policy of a sort that required legislation, and Justice Jackson was
arguing that a President can only enact policy unilaterally and against legislative will
if it is derived directly from his constitutional authority. Although applicable in
situations where Congress is passing bills, Youngstown is inapposite when there is
no promulgation of national policy requiring legislation. This is about the President
receiving advice. Although the Constitution’s lack of express mention of executive
privilege suggests that Congress has more latitude in pressing the issue,105 the
preponderance of case law referencing the constitutional purposes served by
executive privilege should sufficiently distinguish it from policymaking per se that
the President has a protected interest in maintaining confidentiality.
3. Executive Privilege Is Necessary at the Intersection of Separated Powers
Thus, the President has an enormous need to receive the most frank and direct
advice and information possible, which requires some assurance of confidentiality.
One author (who investigated a President on behalf of Congress) asks, “[D]oes the
interest in encouraging full and frank communications provide a substantial reason
for shielding presidential deliberations from outside scrutiny?”106 The Constitution
answers that question in the affirmative. “If presidential advisers must assume they
will be held to account publicly for all approaches that were advanced, considered
but ultimately rejected, they will almost inevitably be inclined to avoid serious
considerations of novel or controversial approaches to presidential problems.”107
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that “wholesale public access to Executive
deliberations and documents would cripple the Executive as a co-equal branch.”108
The prospect of public disclosure would have a chilling effect on the advice given to
the President.109
In a democratic system, there is a cost that attends government secrecy.
“Maintaining the confidentiality of deliberations . . . erodes public trust and
confidence in government. It fuels speculation that government officials have
something to hide. And even when officials reach decisions in a manner consistent
with public ideals and aspirations, it impairs the public’s ability to confirm that that
is true.”110 Despite the veracity of that assertion, confidentiality is nonetheless often
necessary. If the President is approached through an intermediary with a possibility
to serve as an interlocutor to open a channel of communication between two nations
heading toward war, such information is extremely sensitive and disclosing it could
lead to the loss of many lives. More central to America’s national interests, if the
President is conferring with a top military commander about a covert operation
104

Id. at 582.

105

Cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989).

106

Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 200 (2008).

107

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

108

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

109

Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (reasoning that the prospect of
public disclosure of membership in an organization devoted to civil rights for AfricanAmericans would have a chilling effect on recruiting and retaining members).
110

Lee, supra note 106, at 203-04.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss1/4

16

2010]

MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK

47

involving U.S. forces in a hostile country, forced disclosure of that conversation
could cost American troops their lives and possibly plunge the United States into
war. It is patently absurd to suggest that the Constitution does not protect the ability
of the commander-in-chief and diplomatic head of state to engage in protected
conversations when such issues are implicated. The Constitution is not a suicide
pact,111 either for individual Americans or for the republic itself in a dangerous
world.
Hence, executive privilege is necessary. The purpose of executive privilege
covering presidential communications is to encourage candid discussions:
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations
and correspondence . . . [arises from] the necessity for protection of the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must
be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.112
Policy discussions sometimes require blunt assessments of the ramifications for
proposed courses of action. Some alternatives have possible consequences that need
to be explicated in stark terms to ensure that the President appreciates their gravity.
But in a political world, individual statements can be taken out of context to weaken
political adversaries, and so presidential advisers (many of whom have political
ambitions, either regarding higher-level presidential appointments or regarding
elected office) would be motivated through self-interest to censor their statements or
reframe them in such a way that they could not be turned against the speaker. If the
adviser anticipated that his statements may be publicly divulged, and the adviser
could not formulate a politically-correct manner in which to phrase the advice, he
might forego giving it altogether.
It also goes without saying that there is a correlation between the seriousness of
the situation being discussed and the downside of certain policy choices; to govern at
the national level involves making difficult choices. It follows that in discussing
such challenging situations absolute candor is needed most. But it is also true,
should things go awry, that the more serious a situation in which presidential
decisions are being made, the more likely it is that Congress will investigate the
matter.113 This results in a syllogism: the situations that most require frank, candid,
and perhaps unpopular advice are those in which presidential advisers would be most
concerned about having to repeat that advice before a watching world during a
subsequent congressional committee hearing conducted by the opposition political
111
See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Although
Justice Jackson’s statement referenced only the Bill of Rights, the context carries over here
regarding constitutional principles found in the body of the original Constitution.
112

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).

113

Two examples of this would be the U.S. government response after the 9/11 attacks and
the events preceding the Iraq War. Both resulted in congressionally-created commissions and
numerous congressional committee hearings. Cf. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS,
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (authorized ed. 2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/report/.
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party in front of television cameras. The self-censorship arising from this possibility
would then bar the President from receiving the best possible advice. Given the
gravity of the consequences for the country when such advice is most needed, the
results of this self-censorship could be disastrous to the national interest. Executive
privilege is the only protection against this chilling effect and the consequences it
would precipitate.
Perhaps underestimating these considerations, some advocate that Congress
should always prevail in its attempts to obtain information from the President. One
professor makes the odd contention that, “when an executive branch official raises
executive privilege as a defense justifying her defiance of a congressional subpoena,
the house of Congress is the proper tribunal to determine whether the invocation of
executive privilege was appropriate.”114 That contention seems absurd on its face,
despite its evident support from no one less than Justice Joseph Story,115 as it is not a
balancing of interbranch interests at all. What Congress would ever vote that its
demand for information can be rebuffed? It simply means that the resolution of
every contest between the legislature and the executive should expeditiously end in
the President buckling to Congress. That is hardly the dynamic one would expect
from negotiations between truly coequal branches of government.
The fatal flaw in that argument arises from a faulty model. The Article at issue is
based on the British governmental system, analogizing Congress to Parliament.116
The self-evident problem with that system, however, is that the British government
is one of parliamentary supremacy.117 It misreads history to construe the original
constitutional design as empowering Congress to overcome presidential secrecy by
analogizing to Parliament and the Crown. Because Parliament was supreme in the
British system of government, executive power was not completely inherent in the
monarch. Rather, executive authority was largely derived from Parliament itself, as
parliamentary supremacy makes executive power traceable to parliamentary
authority. Thus there is no true separation of powers in the parliamentary system,
without which no effective analogy can be made to the American concept of
executive privilege. Indeed, the British Constitution is inferred largely from Acts of
Parliament. This system of government stands in sharp contrast with the American
system, under which the branches of government are established as coequals by a
written Constitution.118
114

Chafetz, supra note 57, at 1085-86.

115

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
(1833).
116

ON THE

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

UNITED STATES § 837

Chafetz, supra note 57, at 1093-97, 1100-16.

117

Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 536 (1907); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 572 (1832). Examples of Parliament manifesting its supremacy are manifold, and
Chafetz’s citing to such examples demonstrates the intrinsic flaw in his argument. See, e.g.,
Chafetz, supra note 57, at 1118 & nn.247, 248 & 254 (citing GEORGE MACAULAY
TREVELYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1688-1689, at 96 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1938);
Josh Chafetz, Leaving the House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of
Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177, 188 n.49 (2008)).
118
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 779 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (noting that there is not “a single separation-of-powers case in which [the Court]
ha[s] relied on the structure of the English Government in attempting to understand the
governmental structure erected by the Framers of the Constitution”); cf. id. at 776 (Scalia, J.,
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The Constitution requires a degree of statesmanship among all of the federal
branches to make government work.
The framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all
governmental power in minute detail, relied . . . on the expectation that
where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate
branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of
the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective
functioning of our governmental system.119
When such statesmanship is employed by both political branches, they should often
be able to reach a mutually-acceptable arrangement, which is befitting elected
leaders in a democratic republic. “Through the normal political process of
confrontation, compromise, and accommodation, the coordinate branches can
usually satisfactorily resolve their differences over executive privilege. We cannot
solve our modern dilemma by resorting to the solution that was rejected by the
Framers—that is, by demanding constitutional certitude.”120
Occasionally, however, the coequal branches of government reach an impasse.
When the legislative branch desires information that the executive branch does not
wish to disclose, either they can reach a negotiated accommodation or they cannot.
If they can reach an agreement, then the courts should abstain from involvement
regardless of the terms of the political agreement. When agreement cannot be
reached, Congress employs compulsory process with which the President refuses to
comply, and no settlement can be reached, the courts then must arbitrate the impasse
if properly presented in an Article III case. At that point there must be rules to
determine the outcome. Executive privilege is such a rule.
B. The Rationale and Legal Theory for Executive Privilege
Executive privilege was developed to draw the appropriate lines between
Congress’s undisputed need to obtain information necessary for legislative activity
with the President’s need for candid advice and safeguarding material of a nature
that ought not to be public. Executive privilege is vested in the President by the
Constitution.121 The D.C. Circuit has noted that “[t]here is constitutional power,
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, in the federal government to keep national
security information secret.”122 That power extends to other information that must
be kept confidential.123
concurring in part) (“In drafting the Constitution, the Framers were not seeking to replicate in
America the government of England; indeed, they set their plan of government out in writing
in part to make clear the ways in which it was different from the one it replaced.”).
119

AT&T II, 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

120

ROZELL, supra note 44, at 167.

121

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).

122

AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted).

123

It should be noted, however, that the clause referenced by the D.C. Circuit would be a
very odd locus for executive privilege. This statement is therefore cited for the underlying
principle of the need for confidentiality, not suggesting that executive privilege would be
derived from that clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause is part of the enumerated powers
of Congress in Section 8 of Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Yet executive
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The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional design. While the
legislative branch has 535 members124 and depending how the issue is framed the
judiciary has either nine (the members of the Supreme Court),125 or almost one
thousand,126 the executive is only one person. But the President is distinguished by
more than the singularity of his office. He is the chief of state, a national symbol,
and is the face and voice of the nation. Americans do not have a monarch as chief of
state and then a prime minister who is the chief executive, such as in the United
Kingdom.127 Nor do Americans have both a President and a prime minister, with the
executive authority governing different policy areas divided between them, as in
France.128 Instead, all of these roles are combined in one person in the U.S.
President.129 Aside from the vast powers wielded by the President under Article II,
he has unique resources, a ready press corps to carry his message (whether the press
cares for the President or not), and the unique ability to shape the national
discussion. The Supreme Court acknowledges that “the singularly unique role under
Art. II of a President’s communications and activities, related to the performance of
duties under that Article,”130 require a correspondingly-circumspect legal status.
The concept of executive privilege begins with the proposition that a sitting
President is absolutely immune from testifying to Congress regarding his official
actions,131 as this would be tantamount to the executive branch answering to the
legislative branch as one would to a superior. While that assertion has never been
privilege is a power that the President asserts against the power of Congress in an attempt to
designate something beyond the power of Congress to discover. While it is intuitive that
Congress’s investigatory power should have its situs in the Necessary and Proper Clause, no
persuasive structural or case-law argument can be made that the enumerated powers of
Congress implicitly guarantee converse concomitant rights to the other branches of
government. This statement by the D.C. Circuit is likely correct that the Necessary and
Proper Clause is the optimal locus for the governmental power to withhold certain
information, but that would apply in the context of designating certain information classified
to render it nonsusceptible to demands for public disclosure by enacting governmental-secrets
legislation, rather than to permit the executive branch to withhold information from the
legislative branch. Executive privilege, by contrast and like any other power wielded by
President, must be situated in Article II.
124

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006).

125

It is possible to define the judicial branch as only being nine members in that only the
Supreme Court must exist. The Court’s existence is mandated by the first provision in Article
III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. But that same clause says that Congress may create
federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.
126
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 44, 133 (2006) (establishing nine seats on the Supreme Court, 179
circuit judges, and almost 800 district judges, respectively).
127

See generally 2 CLAYTON ROBERTS, DAVID ROBERTS & DOUGLAS
OF ENGLAND: 1688 TO THE PRESENT (4th ed. 2002).

R. BISSON, A HISTORY

128

See generally MARTIN HARRISON, DE GAULLE TO MITTERRAND: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
FRANCE (Jack Hayward ed., 1993).
129

See generally GEOFFREY M. HORN, THE PRESIDENCY (2008).

130

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974).

131

See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 & n.14, 694 n.19 (1997).
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put to the test, it finds support in the writings of the Framers.132 Assuming arguendo
that statement is true, to the extent that high-ranking White House officials would be
advising the President, they effectively become alter egos of the President, just as
advisers to members of Congress become alter egos of the member,133 and therefore,
making presidential advisers answerable to Congress would carry the same
separation-of-powers concerns between the coequal political branches.
The President extends aspects of his office to those serving under him, in limited
and diminished ways. Executive officers answering to the President are participants
in the President’s executive power on the President’s behalf. This is true in a special
way for members of the White House staff, who do not occupy offices created by
Congress in agencies created by Congress. Members of the White House staff serve
directly under the President as part of the White House Office.134 Among these
officials, the senior aides that consult directly with the President are essentially alter
egos of the President, acting as direct extensions of his office and integral to the
President’s deliberations and actions.
The privilege held by such advisers is a derivative of the protection enjoyed by
the President himself. Therefore, to understand the nature and scope of the
immunity possessed by senior presidential advisers as a result of executive privilege,
it is necessary to understand how that immunity applies to the President.
The President holds special legal protection, especially during his term of office.
Although it has never been put to the test in court, most scholars believe that a sitting
President cannot be criminally prosecuted while in office.135 There is a strong
historical and legal foundation for this proposition. The Great Chief Justice once
stated that “[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the
president as against an ordinary individual.”136 While the President is not “above the
law,”137 it is nonetheless the case that “special considerations control when the
Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.”138 This
protection exists for the good of the nation, not the benefit of the person occupying
the presidency.
Although most of this Article focuses on executive privilege regarding top White
House advisers, it should be noted that the relationship between the President and the
Attorney General is unique. Although the Office of the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice are creations of Congress,139 the Attorney General is a lawyer
132

E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

133

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-17 (1972) (“[T]he day-to-day work of such
aides is so critical to the Members’ performance that they must be treated as the latter’s alter
egos . . . .”).
134

See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-606
OF THE PRESIDENT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1−8, 24 (2008).
135

GOV, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE

1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754-55 (3d ed. 2000).

136

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Marshall,
C.J., Circuit Justice).
137

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974).

138

Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004).

139

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 501, 503 (2006).
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whose duties include advising the President on legal matters.140 This has the color of
an attorney-client relationship, and as such has shades of attorney-client privilege. It
is a long-held position that conversations between the President and the Attorney
General are privileged.141
IV. CURRENT EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
The current state of executive privilege doctrine is a checkerboard of disjointed
case law. As a constitutional doctrine, it is governed by case law rather than
statute.142 The Supreme Court has held that it is within the purview of the judiciary
to delineate executive privilege.143 The current rule is the balancing test of United
States v. Nixon and its progeny,144 a case with facts that were unusual enough to
leave many aspects of executive privilege yet to be decided as questions of first
impression.
There are different forms of executive privilege. The first is the presidential
communications privilege, which concerns direct communication with the President
and is rooted in the separation of powers.145 The other is the deliberative process
privilege announced in In re Sealed Case, which concerns executive
communications to which the President is not a party but still involves governmental
deliberations and finds its origin in the common law rather than the separation of
powers.146 This deliberative process privilege, therefore, extends to senior
presidential advisers even when the President is not personally involved.147 The
former is stronger and owed greater deference and protection by the judiciary, which
is intuitively correct since executive privilege, like all executive power under the
Constitution,148 finds its locus in the President and radiates from him to subordinate
functionaries. And the presidential privilege endures in the fact of alleged
misconduct, while the deliberative privilege does not.149
140

Id. § 511.

141

E.g., Confidentiality of the Att’y Gen.’s Commc’ns in Counseling the President, 6 Op.
O.L.C. 481 (1982).
142
Some consider it possible for Congress to calibrate the scope of executive privilege.
E.g., William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon,
22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 118-19 (1974). But assuming arguendo that such strictures would be
constitutional, they would still have to be passed by Congress in accordance with the
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, not implied by a single-chamber resolution from the
congressional chamber seeking enforcement of a committee subpoena. Given the importance
of executive privilege, it is difficult to imagine circumstances where any President would sign
such a bill into law.
143

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).

144

Id.

145

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

146

Id. (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 & n.35 (1982)).

147

Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749-50.
148

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745-46.

149

Id. at 746.
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In announcing the deliberative privilege in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit
broadened executive privilege to a scope beyond the Supreme Court’s holding in
Nixon.150 The case concerned documents sought in an Independent Counsel
investigation of Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy, where the White House asserted
privilege.151 The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the White House on 84 demanded
documents.152 This became the first case in which a court denied Congress
disclosure by applying executive privilege to cover information with which the
President was not personally involved or aware.
A. Contextual Observations
Although not explored in this Article, there are two issues that should be noted
before examining current executive privilege doctrine and how it could be improved.
First, the composition of executive-privilege case law is unusual. There are few
Supreme Court cases; most cases are from the federal circuit or district court situated
in the District of Columbia. This composition is partly due to the political calendar,
as the relatively-short windows between presidential and congressional elections
often result in executive privilege cases becoming moot or otherwise nonjusticiable.
Another reason is geographical. With few exceptions,153 most executive privilege
cases are filed in Washington, D.C. Therefore, D.C. Circuit and D.C. District
precedents supply most of the controlling authority on executive privilege cases.
This resulting case law should be noted because several executive privilege rules
would be questions of first impression if the cases noted here go up on appeal, and
thus, the governing law could change substantially with relatively little adjudication.
Second, this Article does not explore various threshold issues that must be
addressed before reaching the merits of these cases. The D.C. Circuit held that cases
with fact patterns such as the ones discussed herein are justiciable.154 Conflicts
between the legislative and executive branches over congressional subpoenas can be
litigated,155 including executive privilege assertions.156 But as a jurisdictional
threshold to such adjudication,157 the plaintiffs must establish standing,158 requiring
150

Nelson Lund & Douglas R. Cox, Executive Power and Governmental Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Clinton Legacy, 17 J.L. & POL. 631, 651-52 (2001) (discussing In re Sealed
Case, 121 F.3d 729).
151

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 734.

152

Id.

153
E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997)
(concerning information sought by a grand jury in connection with the Independent Counsel
investigation into President Clinton).
154
AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
155

AT&T II, 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

156
E.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp.
51 (D.D.C. 1973).
157

Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)).
158

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).
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“an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to
the defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling.”159 The Supreme Court has cautioned that where separation of powers is
involved, as with executive privilege, consideration of standing must be “especially
rigorous,”160 because “the case-or-controversy limitation is crucial to maintaining the
‘tripartite allocation of power’ set forth in the Constitution.”161 Although the D.C.
Circuit had held that the House has standing to assert its investigatory power,162
subsequent Supreme Court opinions introduce doubt as to whether there might be
substantial limitations to when Congress has standing to pursue executive privilege
cases in court.163 And there are other threshold issues as well, such as whether the
House has a cause of action.164 While these issues are beyond the scope of this
Article, they should be noted and must be explored when adjudicating executive
privilege cases, as they create significant obstacles to litigation.
B. The United States v. Nixon Balancing Test and Modern Procedure
Two 1974 cases create the framework for executive privilege claims. The D.C.
Circuit considered an executive privilege claim against the U.S. Senate, and the
Supreme Court faced a claim against a court subpoena in a criminal investigation.
These cases were the first concerning executive privilege at the presidential level,
and both adopted Chief Justice Marshall’s contention from an early trial court
decision that the federal judiciary has the power to determine the propriety and
enforceability of subpoenas against the President.165
1. What Is Protected by the Current Rule
The D.C. Circuit case was Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activites v. Nixon,166 the second round of litigation previously styled Nixon v.
Sirica.167 At issue was President Nixon’s refusal to turn over to the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities audio tapes of his conversations
159

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
160

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).

161

Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).
162

AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 391.

163

Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting Raines, 521 U.S. at

829).
164
Mem. of Points and Auths. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss & in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.
for Partial Summ. J. on Counts I and II, supra note 20, at 38-39 (citing Stoneridge Inv.
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001)).
165
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692) (Marshall, C.J.,
Circuit Justice).
166

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
167

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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with White House Counsel John Dean.168 This was the first time Congress attempted
to compel divulging such information.169 The D.C. Circuit held that the President
holds a presumptive privilege against congressional inquiries, rather than an absolute
privilege,170 a view later ratified by the Supreme Court.171
The Supreme Court took up the question of an executive privilege claim for the
first time in United States v. Nixon.172 The trial court and President Nixon had
reached an impasse when, following his being named an unindicted coconspirator,173
the court subpoenaed audio tapes held by President Nixon and Nixon asserted
executive privilege.174 Rejecting Nixon’s argument that the President holds an
absolute privilege,175 the Court stated that “neither the doctrine of separation of
powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
[investigative] process under all circumstances.”176 In its analysis, the Court
announced a balancing test which still controls executive privilege cases. A court
“must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the
dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch,”177
balancing the public interest served by protecting the President’s confidentiality
against the public interest served by disclosure.178
Foreign matters are subject to a higher level of protection than domestic. Aside
from national security or foreign policy, executive privilege can be defeated by “an
adequate showing of need.”179 For congressional subpoenas, the question is
“whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative
function.”180 For example, in AT&T I the D.C. Circuit weighed Congress’s need for
the information sought against the risk to national security.181 The D.C. Circuit has
noted that the executive branch is entitled to greater deference where foreign policy
is concerned,182 and that the Supreme Court has said in dictum that its holdings thus
168

Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d. at 726.

169

Id. at 733.

170

Id. at 729-31.

171

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).

172

Id. at 686-709.

173

Id. at 686.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 703.

176

Id. at 706.

177

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).

178

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

179

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

180

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
181

AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

182

Id. at 392 (citing Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103
(1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
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far on executive privilege are not intended to control questions concerning military,
diplomatic, or national security matters.183
In AT&T I, a House subcommittee subpoenaed documents regarding warrantless
wiretaps that AT&T had facilitated for the FBI.184 Negotiations with the White
House failed, at which point President Ford asserted that AT&T was acting as a
government agent and accordingly instructed AT&T not to comply with the
subpoena.185 When AT&T refused to obey President Ford, believing it was legally
bound to honor the subpoena,186 the Justice Department sought to enjoin
compliance,187 resulting in a district court order favoring the White House.188 The
D.C. Circuit found that the case was properly understood as an interbranch dispute
between Congress and the White House,189 so the case turned on the reach of
executive privilege. These wiretaps were for national security,190 so the court’s
upholding of executive privilege, given the tenuous nature of the President’s claim
that AT&T was a government instrumentality, illustrates the extraordinary protection
the privilege affords in national security contexts.
Military secrets are always protected by a close cousin of the national-security
executive privilege, the state secrets privilege.191 One case, United States v.
Reynolds, involved family of deceased Air Force personnel seeking information
regarding their deaths in a military plane crash.192 The Supreme Court upheld the
military’s refusal to release the information, holding that “even the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake.”193
The D.C. Circuit has also held that the Supreme Court precedents governing
executive privilege in criminal proceedings apply to civil proceedings as well,194
though the Supreme Court has not had occasion to accept or reject that conclusion.
There are two prongs to the executive privilege test in a criminal case: (1) the
183

Id. at 391 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)). Although some
were concerned that this language regarding almost insurmountable privilege for national
security information would invite Presidents to abuse the special national security protections,
e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 142, at 117-18, subsequent years have not justified that concern.
184

AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 385.

185

Id. at 387.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 387-88.

189

Id. at 389.

190

Id. at 385.

191

See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57-59
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also STEPHEN DYCUS
ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1037-55 (4th ed. 2007).
192

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1953).

193

Id. at 11.

194

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743-45 (D.C. Cir 1997); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d
242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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subpoenaed materials must likely contain important evidence, and (2) that evidence
cannot otherwise be discovered by due diligence.195 Although executive privilege
has been extended to civil matters, it is an open question whether this rule in
criminal cases is also the rule in civil suits.
The D.C. Circuit has also outlined the procedure for executive privilege. The
privilege may be invoked if information required from the executive involves
presidential decision making or deliberation.196 Only the President can assert the
privilege.197 The material is presumptively privileged, a presumption that can be
overcome by an adequate showing of need,198 after which the court conducts an in
camera examination of the material, excising from the documents material it finds
privileged.199 For the material that passes initial review, the President must be given
an opportunity before disclosure to present more particularized claims to justify
withholding those items,200 and the court then releases the material if those
supplemental claims are rejected.201 While the in camera inspection is conducted to
determine whether executive privilege applies,202 the inspection itself only occurs
after the party seeking disclosure makes a showing of need.203 Until such a showing
has been made, the White House need not submit subpoenaed information even to
the courts for inspection.204
The D.C. Circuit considers executive privilege analogous to attorney-client
privilege, stating:
[No authority] explain[s] why legal advice should be on a higher plane
than advice about policy, or politics, or why a President’s conversation
with the most junior lawyer in the White House Counsel’s Office is
deserving of more protection from disclosure . . . than a President’s
discussions with his Vice President or a Cabinet Secretary. In short, we
do not believe that lawyers are more important to the operations of
government than all other officials, or that the advice lawyers render is
more crucial to the functioning of the Presidency than the advice coming
from all other quarters.205
The court here states there is no rationale why attorneys in government should enjoy
a stronger privilege than presidential deliberations. But the converse is the important
195

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 754.

196

Id. at 744.

197

See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 135, at 776 n.40.

198

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 744-45.

199

Id. at 745.

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

203

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
204

Id. at 730-31.

205

In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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point: the D.C. Circuit accords presidential communications the same confidentiality
protection as applies in an attorney-client relationship. If cabinet secretaries, holding
offices created by acts of Congress and only after being independently confirmed by
the Senate, enjoy such protection, then it follows a fortiori that senior White House
advisers, part of the Office of the President who never must be submitted to
Congress for its approval, should enjoy that level of protection.
Subpoenas also cannot overcome executive privilege if the authority issuing
them is engaged in “a general fishing expedition.”206 The Court suggests that
congressional investigations cannot attempt to “expose for the sake of exposure.”207
This suggests a subpoena would be illegitimate if there was no bona fide legislative
purpose (which is to say, likely just a political ploy). If so, that suggests courts can
inquire into the purpose of a given subpoena, and possibly find it unenforceable.208
Congress also cannot defeat executive privilege if those pursuing the information
“seek in any way to investigate the wisdom of the President’s discharge of his
discretionary duties.”209 The Court invalidated a congressional investigation in 1881
as being “clearly judicial” because it lacked a legislative purpose,210 establishing
“that Congress must have a valid legislative purpose for conducting an investigation
and for exercising the power of compulsory process.”211
The privilege is designed to err on the side of protecting executive
confidentiality. The D.C. Circuit held Senate subpoenas investigating possible
illegalities during the 1972 election insufficient to overcome executive privilege,212
even though investigating illegalities was the reason the committee was created.213
Consistent with that approach, the Supreme Court has more recently determined that
the White House does not need to “invoke[e] executive privilege with sufficient
specificity and . . . particularized objections” as such detailed accounting would
impose an administrative hardship.214 The privilege therefore acts to prevent
annoying or harassing procedures that could distract the President or impair
executive officials fulfilling their duties.
Although this Article focuses on presidential privilege, it is also quite likely that
some future controversies will center on deliberative process privilege if some of the
206

Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717.

207

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).

208

Case law is silent as to how deferential courts should be in making this inquiry. Must
they presume good faith? How can that presumption be overcome? Is the standard of review
a preponderance of the evidence, or must the evidence be clear and convincing? Is a court
free to look askance at the subpoena and make Congress carry the burden? These are some of
the many questions still open.
209

Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717.

210

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1881).

211

J. Richard Broughton, Paying Ambition’s Debt: Can the Separation of Powers Tame the
Impetuous Vortex of Congressional Investigations?, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 797, 805 (2000).
212

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
213

See id. at 726 & n.2 (quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong. § 1(a) (1973)).

214

Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 388 (2004).
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sought-after information did not personally involve the President.
deliberative privilege applies to

This lesser

communications authored or solicited and received by those members of
an immediate White House adviser’s staff who have broad and significant
responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given the
President on the particular matter to which the communications relate.
Only communications at that level are close enough to the President to be
revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his
advisers.215
By cautioning that “presidential communications privilege should never serve as a
means of shielding information regarding governmental operations that do not call
ultimately for direct decisionmaking by the President,”216 the D.C. Circuit extended
that privilege by negative inference to include anything that may ultimately require a
presidential decision.217 This could be broadly construed to cover a great deal of
information, so likely additional judicial consideration will be necessary to trace the
limits of that extension.
2. What Is (or May Be) Unprotected Under This Rule
Although there may be some aspects of criminal investigations where executive
privilege could be used, it does not completely protect any individual. The Supreme
Court found that “[t]he impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would
place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts
under Art. III.”218 The Court held that allowing executive privilege to thwart “a
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes . . . would upset the
constitutional balance of ‘a workable government’ and gravely impair the role of the
courts under Art. III,”219 and it explained at length how allowing executive privilege
to scuttle bona fide criminal investigations would undermine confidence in the
criminal justice system.220
Executive privilege involving the President is limited to presidential
communications relating to his responsibilities, affairs of office, public policy, and
presidential decisions.221 It does not apply to actions he committed before becoming
President,222 though district courts possess the power to delay pending litigation
during the President’s term.223 Similarly, although “Presidential privilege clearly
must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving the materials and
215

In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

216

Id.

217

Cf. Lund & Cox, supra note 150, at 655-56.

218

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).

219

Id.

220

Id. at 708-09.

221

Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (citations omitted).

222

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997).

223

Id. at 706-08.
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maintaining access to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes,”224 a
court could delay their disclosure during the President’s tenure in office.
The D.C. Circuit has reasoned that although fact-finding of past events is part of
the legislative process, such information is less important than in court proceedings
because legislating focuses more on anticipating policy consequences than precisely
reconstructing past events.225 While no executive privilege rule has been
propounded from this reasoning, it suggests that there are situations where executive
privilege would not prevail if a court finds that the sought-after information is
essential in a courtroom setting because reconstructing facts would be essential to
litigation, but falling short if intended for a congressional committee setting in which
those facts would be nonessential.
C. Unanswered Questions Regarding Enumerated Powers such as Appointment
Power
The case law therefore leaves a great many questions unanswered regarding
executive privilege, again owing to the fact that executive privilege claims are rarely
litigated. Such questions include:
[W]ho can assert executive privilege, the extent to which a sitting
President can override the executive privilege claim of a former President,
the length of the period of secrecy justified by a President’s need for
candid advice, and whether a President can compel the silence of
subordinates by invoking executive privilege.226
This underdevelopment of executive privilege doctrine makes the privilege
problematic as a legal matter, with broad areas of uncertainty on this constitutional
doctrine.
The Supreme Court provides a guidepost for such questions. The principle
underlying executive privilege, which must guide its development and application, is
“that the District Court has a very heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential
conversations, which are either not relevant or not admissible, are accorded that high
degree of respect due the President of the United States.”227 Although it is common
for Presidents of both parties to be targets of unfavorable editorials and even humor,
the law must be mindful that “[t]he President’s unique status under the Constitution
distinguishes him from other executive officials,”228 and thus, judicial actions
directed at the President must treat him in a manner consistent with respect befitting
the dignity of his office.
1. Exploring Unresolved Questions
One question often overlooked or disregarded sub silentio is how the contours of
executive privilege should differ based on the setting in which it is asserted. Many
224

Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 454.
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Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Lilley, supra note 1, at 1135.
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of the principal cases creating the case law governing executive privilege were
courtroom cases,229 and casebooks often discuss executive privilege in a courtroom
setting alongside other evidentiary privileges.230 In such cases there is Congress (or
some other party) proffering its strongest argument in an adversarial fashion against
the White House, which in turn rebuts with its strongest argument, with a federal
judge sitting as a neutral arbiter to weigh the competing interests and rule on the
assertion of privilege. By contrast, there is no neutral arbiter in a congressional
hearing. The hearing is presided over by the chairman, who rules on questions or
assertions of either the witnesses before him (here, perhaps a senior White House
adviser) or of other members of the committee.231 But the chairman is the only
person with the authority to issue the subpoena seeking the testimony in the first
place.232 The chairman is not neutral; he is either a politician of the President’s
party, or he is a politician of the opposition party. Therefore, it is a foregone
conclusion which way the chairman will rule on an assertion of any privilege to
thwart his subpoena.
The Supreme Court’s ruling that executive privilege cannot defeat a subpoena in
criminal proceedings will not apply to many assertions of executive privilege both
because there is usually no criminal statute involved (excepting of course the fact
that contempt of Congress can have criminal penalties) and also because
congressional oversight hearings are not adversarial proceedings before a neutral
presiding officer, as is the case in a criminal prosecution. By the Court’s own words,
United States v. Nixon clearly does not cover situations such as these, because there
the Court limited its opinion by saying that in that case it was not “concerned with
the balance between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the
need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the [President’s]
confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information.”233 This creates
additional uncertainty regarding civil suits, as the Nixon Court expressly limited its
holding to criminal investigations.234 Though the logic of that case easily extends to
many civil matters, the Court’s own opinion limits its precedential effect to criminal
suits, leaving its civil application an open question.
A final question is the difference of the privilege’s scope in courtroom
proceedings versus congressional proceedings. Aside from the distinctions already
noted, the D.C. Circuit set forth a predicate for differentiating the two referenced
above, saying that Congress’s “legislative judgments normally depend more on the
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political

229

E.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that “the
presidential communications privilege could be overcome by the evidentiary demands of a
civil trial”).
230
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acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events.”235 Where a court is able
to separate cases when such reconstruction is required, it is possible to fashion
different legal rules.
2. Presidential Appointment Power
In recent investigations, the Chairmen of the House Judiciary Committee and
Senate Judiciary Committee specified that they desired copies of internal White
House documents regarding replacing political-appointee prosecutors.236 That
directly implicates presidential power under the Appointments Clause.
The Constitution gives general appointment power to the President. The
President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”237 Although
Congress can grant appointment power to department heads or the courts,238
Congress can never wield such power itself.239 And although the Senate has a role in
the appointment process of principal officers,240 the House has no role whatsoever.
This Appointments Clause issue has major implications both for one recent
controversy and also for a controversy that may now be looming. As mentioned
above, through the end of the Bush administration, the ongoing legal controversy
involved U.S. attorneys. And with the change in control of the House that occurred
in November 2010, it is quite possible that the federal courts will delve into the
uncharted constitutional waters of congressional oversight of White House “czars.”
All this comes in the context of a major Appointments Clause case in the Supreme
Court, decided just last term.241
Current federal law clearly states that U.S. attorneys are appointed by the
President of the United States, subject to Senate confirmation.242 Although this
appointment is for a four-year term,243 that same statute clearly states that the
President can remove them at any time, and does not require any cause to do so,244
echoing the Supreme Court’s determination that “[t]he power of removal is incident
235

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
236
Letter from Rep. John Conyers & Sen. Patrick Leahy to Fred Fielding, Counsel to the
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-40 (1976). This is a separation-of-powers issue,
explored in more detail below. The only body that can create an office—Congress—is the
only one that never can fill that same office.
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to the power of appointment.”245 Although some could argue that Congress has a
constitutional role to play in overseeing performance, the Court has held that
Congress cannot direct the course of law enforcement by controlling who will
enforce the law.246 That being so, it is difficult to understand what legislative role
Congress is fulfilling by investigating the conversations surrounding the President
replacing one politically-appointed law enforcement officer with another. When
various agencies engage in policymaking under authority delegated by Congress
there is perhaps an argument to be made that Congress can oversee the agency’s use
of this delegated authority that carries a legislative character by its enacting of
policy. But that should not apply where, as here, the questions concern federal
prosecutors, because law enforcement is a purely executive function. Even if it
intends to add some form of “for cause” clause to the appointing statute for U.S.
attorneys, it still would not be necessary to know whether any such cause existed for
those prosecutors replaced under the law as it is currently written.
The Court struck down part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
because some members of the governing body were appointed by Congress.247 In
doing so it made clear that the Constitution is inflexible in prohibiting those who
make the laws from enforcing or administering those laws.248 “The core concern of
[the Appointments Clause] . . . is to ensure that federal executive power remains
structurally independent of Congress and of the congressional power base.”249
The necessity of the President being able to remove political appointees who
serve at his pleasure at any time and for any reason seems self-evident in reading
Article II. The President alone is responsible to seeing that laws are faithfully
executed.250
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a
grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and
unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the
assistance of subordinates. . . . As he is charged specifically to take care
that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the
absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he
should select those who were to act for him under his direction in the
execution of the laws.251
The President is the commander-in-chief of American military forces and chief
executive of the nation’s administration, and therefore, he is vested with the
executive authority of the government to carry out those tasks. The President’s
245
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power to remove appointees was recognized and exercised as such throughout the
entirety of the American presidency.252
This history also holds specific guidance regarding the current controversies.
There is actually one historical precedent on point to this Article. Only once before
has Congress demanded executive records regarding the removal of U.S. attorneys.
The Senate requested Justice Department records to that effect from President
Grover Cleveland, who categorically refused253 because appointing U.S. attorneys “is
vested in the President alone by the Constitution.”254 It should be noted that the
request there was for documents held by the Justice Department, which is a statutory
creation of Congress,255 under an Attorney General who is confirmed by the
Senate.256 In Miers, the request was for direct presidential communications held by
the White House itself, concerning the private deliberations of the President.
Although the courts never had occasion to consider the Cleveland incident, the
Senate’s decision not to pursue the matter further is instructive. If it was acceptable
to refuse such a congressional inquiry when it involved the Justice Department, then
a fortiori it should be all the more acceptable when the question concerns only the
White House.
Regarding U.S. attorneys, the Supreme Court stated in Berger v. United States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.257
One of the fired U.S. attorneys made this point in writing against the
administration.258 But this statement proves far too much if it is used to imply that
there can be no political factors in appointing U.S. attorneys. The usual practice is
that U.S. attorneys are recommended by home-state U.S. senators (holders of
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political office),259 with the decision then made by the President and reviewed by the
Senate (also holders of political office). Taking the above statement to support that
implication would result in U.S. attorneys needing to be civil service employees,
career government workers chosen through a merit-based hiring mechanism.260 The
idea that it is even possible for a person whose hiring comes from a U.S. Senator
recommending someone to the U.S. President and then facing a vote from the U.S.
Senate to obtain the position in question without any political considerations is
simply preposterous, and would therefore be a plain misreading of Berger.
Appointments are among a President’s most consequential acts. The courts have
expressly been mindful of the unitary nature of the executive in matters of executive
privilege, with the D.C. Circuit admonishing that “[t]he Constitution after all vests
the executive power not in the executive branch, but in the President,”261 and the
Supreme Court likewise cautioning that the President is “the chief constitutional
officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy
responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.”262 Some could argue that the
Court has perhaps at times undervalued that distinction recently,263 and so it
behooves the judiciary to appreciate that distinction in defining executive privilege.
However, White House “czars” are an entirely different matter as far as the
Constitution is concerned. “In light of ‘[t]he impossibility that one man should be
able to perform all the great business of the State,’ the Constitution provides for
executive officers to ‘assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his
trust.’”264 That mechanism requires Congress to create the various executive offices
in which these subordinate officers assist the President. As explained in more detail
below, one element of the separation of powers is that only Congress can create such
offices. While the President is welcome to have whomsoever he wishes as a White
House adviser, to suggest or examine specific subjects or topics at the President’s
request, such a person has no executive authority to make any government action
unless that person is an officer of the United States. Although principal officers
must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate before exercising any authority, even inferior
officers can only hold offices that Congress deigns to create.
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D. The Courts Should Adopt a Multi-Factor Test for Interbranch Executive
Privilege Cases
The executive privilege balancing test lends itself to a multi-factor analysis,
rather than individual and discrete per se rules derived from specific cases. The key
to executive privilege claims between the President and Congress is finding the
common border of their constitutional roles. This analysis applies the information
already considered in this Article to construct a judicially-manageable framework for
executive privilege.
The President has a constitutional duty to perform, consisting of executing and
administering the laws, formulating foreign and national-security policy,
commanding the U.S. military, and nominating individuals to various executive and
judicial offices. The President must constantly determine which individuals best suit
his needs in fulfilling his duties, and therefore, he is constantly appointing and
removing subordinates from various offices created by Congress. That role is
independent of Congress, and in it, the President requires information and expert
advice, some of which must be kept confidential for the President to perform his
duty well. Other information, such as that pertaining to military secrets, intelligence,
or sensitive diplomacy, requires even more confidentiality.
Congress also has a constitutional duty to perform, legislating. This duty
includes annual legislation for appropriations and authorizations, which entails
appropriating and authorizing executive departments created by Congress. Further,
these departments are led by officers confirmed by Congress, holding offices created
by Congress, and enacting policy under authority delegated by Congress. Therefore,
Congress requires information regarding the performance of those individuals and
agencies, both to inform its annual monetary and authorizing renewals of those
entities, and also to keep a watchful eye as to whether new legislation is necessary,
prudent, or beneficial.
Thus, both of these constitutional branches have a need for information, and
those informational needs are sometimes in tension or even conflict. There are
discernable lines between what is properly within congressional purview versus what
properly belongs within presidential purview.265 But that line is not uniformly
situated in all executive privilege assertions during interbranch disputes over
265

Such lines should be drawn according to legal formalism, rather than utilitarianism. It
proceeds from the wrong premise to say “[o]utcomes to executive privilege disputes between
the political branches that preserve the governmental structure established by the Constitution
[are] obviously . . . constitutionally preferable to those that do not.” Lilley, supra note 1, at
1144. Such statements are apparently premised on admonitions from the Supreme Court such
as, “[t]he interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must
remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little
play in its joints.” Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). But this utilitarian
approach by academic commentators misreads the Supreme Court’s admonishment and must
be categorically rejected. Any judicial outcome that does not preserve the constitutional
structure is ipso facto unconstitutional and wholly invalid. Promulgating clear constitutional
rules for executive privilege sometimes exacerbates interbranch political conflicts. Peter M.
Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for
Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 220-21 (1992). Although it is true that when the
political branches resort to hardball tactics during times of partisan impasse, the outcomes are
rarely optimal, see Lilley, supra note 1, at 1145-48, that is not the proper concern of the
judiciary.
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information. There are several factors that shift the line toward executive
confidentiality or toward legislative oversight, depending on the actors involved and
the government action at issue.
This suggests that the courts should employ a multi-factor analysis in executive
privilege cases.266 There are at least seven discernable factors (not including
subfactors) that counsel either for or against executive privilege in a given situation,
and courts may discover others as they apply this framework. Employing this
framework would facilitate a consistent and logical resolution of executive privilege
cases. This, in turn, would inform both political branches of what is and is not
protected over time as a court applies the framework to different cases, which should
increasingly help obviate future litigation between the elected branches.
1. Office Created by Congress
The first factor is whether the information sought is held by an agency created by
Congress. As previously mentioned, Congress has an oversight role largely as an
incident to its appropriating function. To the extent that Congress has an oversight
role beyond appropriating,267 it can assert a responsibility to monitor the
effectiveness of legislation it has passed. A logical extension of that reasoning is
that if an agency is a creation of Congress, then Congress can claim a duty to gather
such information as is necessary to determine whether that agency is functioning
properly. For example, the Department of Agriculture is a creation of Congress, and
so Congress could cite a responsibility to assess whether the department is properly
fulfilling Congress’s intended purpose for the department. To the extent that this
factor is present, it weighs in favor of disclosing information to Congress.
2. Policymaking
The second factor is whether the information pertains to policymaking.
Legislation is the codification of public policy. It is appropriate to say that
policymaking is often—if not always—legislative in nature, whether it is being
performed by the legislature or some other branch. Administrative actions such as
rulemaking and promulgating regulations are often policymaking actions. To the
extent that executive actors are policymaking, they are engaged in an action that is
arguably legislative. To the extent that the action is legislative, it is partaking in the
legislative function.268 Congress, as the legislative branch, can rightfully assert that
266
It should be noted that some object to the concept of courts resolving these disputes.
E.g., Chafetz, supra note 57, at 1153 (“The Constitution does not set the judiciary up as a
parent figure, ready to solve disputes between fractious political siblings.”). But the
Constitution does empower the judiciary to say “what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)—that is, to draw the constitutional lines in such a way as to
resolve intrinsic tensions.
267
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (stating that Congress has “the power
of inquiry . . . [as] an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function”).
268

However, the executive branch of government can never exercise legislative power per
se. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“Although this Court since 1928 has treated the ‘intelligible principle’ requirement as the
only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to administrative agencies, the
Constitution does not speak of ‘intelligible principles.’ Rather, it speaks in much simpler
terms: ‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.’” (citations
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policymaking actions fall under its jurisdiction, because such actions are performed
under Congress’s statutory delegation of authority.269
For example, the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) determinations regarding what level of
arsenic is safe for drinking water would be a policy judgment that could be enacted
with legislation, and Congress could inquire into the reasoning that went into
formulating that standard.270 Therefore, Congress can claim a right to information
regarding this policymaking, under the theory that because Congress delegated the
power being exercised, the delegating authority has a right to monitor its use to
determine whether that delegation should be rescinded or modified. This factor
weighs in favor of disclosure to Congress.
As a subfactor of this second factor, if the information does concern
policymaking, then the nature of the policy is important. The executive branch has
primary, and thus, enhanced authority regarding foreign policy. Foreign policy can
also be more sensitive in nature, requiring greater confidentiality, and more directly
impact diplomatic, military, and national security concerns, which the Court has
acknowledged to be the apex of presidential strength in executive privilege
disputes.271 Therefore, Defense Department rules and regulations that impact the
capabilities of U.S. troops stationed overseas should be more protected than
Agriculture Department rules and regulations for meat inspections.
3. Extra-White House Origins
The third factor is if the information is held by an agency that is part of the White
House, whether it is a statutory creation that was ever independent of the White
House. The Executive Office of the President does not just include the White House
Office; it includes a variety of offices. Some of these were formerly independent
agencies that were subsumed into the Executive Office of the President, bringing it
under the aegis of the President.272 For example, the Office of Management and
omitted)). Contra FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1826 n.2 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
269

See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472; J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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Congress investigated proposed changes in what level of arsenic in drinking water is
safe, a decision that Congress allowed the EPA to make. A change was ordered in the final
days of Bill Clinton’s presidency and then was reversed by George W. Bush. See James M.
Taylor, Congress Preempts EPA in Mandating New Arsenic Standards, ENV’T & CLIMATE
NEWS, Oct. 1, 2001, http://www.heartland.org /full/844/Congress_preempts_EPA_in_mand
ating_new_arsenic_standards.html.
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See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
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The constitutional status of these instances of the President deciding to subsume
“independent” agencies into the White House is questionable to some degree. (The word
“independent” is in quotes because, as Justice Scalia observed, Article II of the Constitution
declares that all executive power is vested in the President, and thus, the concept of an
executive agency independent of the President seems an oxymoron. See Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
1).). If an agency was created by Congress as an administrative entity, why redesignate it to a
new status within the executive branch? What is the constitutional rationale for establishing
varying grades of separation from the President, who is the chief executive of the federal
government? This creation and promulgation of the Executive Office of the President,
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Budget was formerly the Bureau of the Budget, a part of the Treasury Department
created in 1921.273 President Franklin Roosevelt brought it under his more direct
control by making it an office within the White House in 1939.274 It, therefore, still
carries an element of statutory creation even though it is now to some degree part of
the White House. Such a factor counsels against executive privilege and in favor of
disclosure.
4. Textual Commitment in the Constitution
The fourth factor is whether there is a textual commitment of the underlying
subject or individual in the Constitution. Textual commitments are strong indicia of
which branch of government should have primacy for any given government action
or policy area. If the matter in question is referenced in Article II, such as military
matters implicated by the Commander-in-Chief Clause,275 this counsels in favor of
confidentiality.
This is consonant with executive privilege being possibly
undefeatable where national security is concerned, and also finds support in the fact
that the related state-secrets privilege is insurmountable.276 If the subject at issue in a
given case involves Article I matters, such as expenditures implicating the
Appropriations Clause277 or regulation of interstate commerce,278 then it counsels in
favor of disclosure to Congress.
The most significant of the textual commitments favoring Congress is if
Congress is contemplating the impeachment or removal of the President. There is a
certain presumption of good faith when the President is in his normal standing with
the nation. Even a President wracked by scandal is still the President and cannot be
made to endure undue interference, as the nation would suffer if the President were
impaired from the performance of his duties. But the House retains the power of
impeachment279 and the Senate the power of removal,280 and if those bodies formally
consisting of entities that are external to the White House, but somehow less distinct than they
formerly were as independent agencies, creates a perplexing intermediate stage of quasiindependent entities. As Justice Robert Jackson observed, the proliferation of so-called
independent agencies in the regulatory state is problematic in its own right when delineating
constitutional lines of authority, arguably going beyond the tripartite form of government
prescribed by the Constitution by almost creating a fourth branch of government. See FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). It only further complicates
the constitutional justifications of such a system to take executive branch entities that were
considered in some degree independent from the President, then to give them a new
designation denoting closer proximity to the President than merely being agencies in the
executive branch (i.e., Executive Office of the President) and yet somehow not part of the
White House itself by remaining outside the White House Office.
273
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embark upon that course, then the presumption of good faith and deference to the
President is lessened. He is under a political indictment of constitutional
proportions. Thus, if the House or Senate is engaged in impeachment or removal
proceedings, then this setting would be a factor in Congress’s favor in overcoming
executive privilege.281
5. Presidential Involvement
The fifth factor is whether the President was personally involved. The executive
power is vested in the President, and the interest in confidentiality has its locus in the
President. The distinction between the presidential communications privilege and
the deliberative process privilege, with the former being more powerful, supports
making presidential involvement a factor. Presidential involvement counsels in
favor of confidentiality, as it raises a constitutional concern.
Without a
constitutional concern, the courts have already held executive privilege sans
presidential involvement to be merely common law in origin.282 If the courts
adopted this factor it would provide a more coherent rationale for the distinction of
the two forms of executive privilege and help integrate executive privileges into a
unified doctrine.
In the event of presidential involvement, the degree of that involvement becomes
a subfactor. There is an interest in presidential confidentiality, and the risk of
disclosure being revelatory of presidential deliberations is positively correlated to the
level of presidential involvement in any given situation. The President seeing one
memorandum on an issue does not entail the same degree of confidentiality interest
as the President having a dozen meetings with his senior advisers to discuss that
same issue. The more involved the President is, the stronger this factor counsels in
favor of confidentiality.
6. Nature of Other Actors
The sixth factor is the nature of the actors aside from the President. Not all nonpresidential actors are equal in terms of executive privilege. There are five
subfactors under this heading that form a continuum, and as one progresses through
that continuum the interest in presidential confidentiality decreases while the interest
in congressional discovery increases.
The first subfactor, with the strongest interest in confidentiality, is the Vice
President of the United States. The Supreme Court has held that the Vice President
shares in executive privilege.283 The Vice President is an independent constitutional
officer, specifically named in Article II. Although the textual grants of authority to
the Vice President seem minor, the Vice President’s status as a constitutional officer
nonetheless renders him utterly independent of Congress.284 Also, the Vice President
281
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is by statute a member of the National Security Council,285 vesting him with a
significant national security portfolio. Additionally, recent administrations give the
appearance of the Vice President being heavily involved in senior-level presidential
deliberations. And unlike the President’s other advisers, which serve at the pleasure
of the President and can therefore be replaced at will to shield the President, the Vice
President holds his office for a period coterminous with the President, creating a
unique concern for confidentiality.
The second subfactor is, within government personnel, whether the actor is a
Senate-confirmed employee. There is actually an argument on both sides of this
factor. The first is that Senate-confirmed employees are principal officers instead of
inferior officers286 and as such are closer in proximity to the President. The closer
the proximity to the President, the greater the interest is in confidentiality. The
counterargument is that the Senate’s confirmation of the individual gives Congress
an enhanced interest in holding him accountable. This may be true, but if so that
would apply only to Senate oversight. Restricting the scope of the argument for a
moment to the House, Senate-confirmed employees should enjoy greater executiveprivilege protection.287
The third subfactor is, within appointed personnel, commissioned officers versus
non-officers. This has the same concern given under the second subfactor. On one
hand government officers that are not Senate confirmed can be considered closer to
the President and therefore be attended by a greater interest in privilege, while on the
other hand those offices are created by Congress, and so Congress can assert an
interest in accountability. On balance, however, this should be seen as an exercise of
the President’s express appointment power, which mentions inferior officers but
does not mention governmental appointees of lower rank that are not officers.
Therefore, this counsels in favor of confidentiality.
The fourth subfactor is, within governmental personnel, appointed individuals
versus career individuals. Appointed individuals should have a greater interest in
confidentiality because they are beneficiaries of the President’s appointment power,
showing a textual commitment to the President in the Constitution. Other
government employees hold their jobs only under congressional authority and
appropriations, which counsels in favor of congressional oversight. These
employees enjoyment of civil service protection solely as a grant of congressional
action augments Congress’s interest in being able to subject these employees to
oversight.
The fifth subfactor is government personnel versus the private sector.
Employees of the executive branch are—at least from a constitutional perspective—
ultimately carrying out the agenda of the chief executive. Employees of the private
sector, although they can contract with a government entity to carry out programs
and actions for the executive, are not by their nature subordinates to the President.
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Therefore, private sector involvement counsels strongly in favor of disclosure to
Congress.
7. Czars
A new element in the governmental structure that could be listed as a subfactor
of the previous heading, but has become a factor in its own right under this heading,
is whether the officer is a “czar.” There is a distinction between White House staff
versus personnel in an agency or department. The White House exists as a
constitutional imperative, whereas no other executive-branch entity can make such a
claim.288 Within this framework, there is a separation between the roles of White
House personnel versus other executive officers. The former are advisory in nature,
whereas the latter exercise operational management through administrative action
and implementing the President’s directions.
To the extent that a czar is a White House adviser with no powers other than that
of any other adviser, there is no difference in terms of executive privilege. Similarly,
if a person is called a czar, but is in fact a Senate-confirmed principal officer, the
moniker of “czar” is again of no moment. (For example, the director of the White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy is called the “drug czar,” but in reality
is a Senate-confirmed officer occupying an office created by an act of Congress.289)
So that is to say, if someone is called a czar but in fact is otherwise indistinguishable
from other political appointees in the executive branch, then there is no
constitutional concern regarding that appointee’s status.
But a President cannot have his cake and eat it, too. No President can create a
governmental office without congressional authorization if that office exercises
executive authority. Even if such an office exists, no President can then appoint any
person to hold such an office, unless Congress by statute authorizes him to do so.290
And if that person wields sufficient stature or power to be regarded as a principal
officer, then Senate must first confirm that person.291 So if a President names a czar
who is anything other than a White House adviser—a person who exercises any
government authority over any public or private person or entity—then such a
person has no lawful protection for his actions, and as such, this factor strongly
counsels in favor of disclosure.
This factor should weigh heavily in favor of disclosure because of the inherent
illegitimacy of such czars whenever they engage in operational management. For
example, take so-called “terrorism czar” John Brennan, who is President Obama’s
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Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.292
A terrorist referred to in the media as the “underwear bomber” attempted to detonate
an explosive device onboard a transatlantic flight shortly before the airliner landed in
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.293 Shortly after the incident the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) asked Mr. Brennan if the Director should
prematurely end his skiing vacation with his son and return to Washington, D.C., to
take up his post at the NCTC; Mr. Brennan told the Director that he could continue
on his vacation.294
Rather than acting as an adviser to the President, here, Mr. Brennan was
assuming operational control of a situation and issuing instructions to a Senateconfirmed official managing an executive agency. Yet, Mr. Brennan was never
confirmed by the Senate, and for that matter his office was never created or
sanctioned by Congress. He was acting completely outside the constitutional
framework, wielding extraordinary power without any public accountability. Such
accountability is the quintessential hallmark of the rationales underlying the
Appointments Clause.295 To allow such exertions of power by someone who is
neither elected through the democratic process (the President) nor subject to
congressional oversight and confirmation (principal officers) circumvents critical
constitutional safeguards that serve as a check on governmental power. Individuals
acting as de facto principal officers in the name of the President should be
completely unprotected by executive privilege and fully answerable to Congress.
Again, with the exception of “czars” acting as executive-branch officers asserting
operational authority, none of these factors or subfactors is intrinsically dispositive.
But, by adopting a framework with all of these factors, the courts can establish a
general theory with which to evaluate all executive privilege claims, providing
coherency and predictability to how a court will adjudicate executive privilege
claims.
V. COURTS SHOULD REFUSE BOTH RECENTLY-OFFERED SOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A case study can help demonstrate how this approach would work in litigation.
In the recent Miers case, neither party’s arguments were persuasive; thus, courts
should accordingly decline to adopt either position. The core thesis of both the
White House position and Congress’s position was flawed. There may be no way to
restore the status quo ante; this litigation confirmed the need for the judiciary to
draw a clear line regarding executive privilege, which in the Miers case specifically
concerned when the President is discussing an exercise of his explicit constitutional
power with his immediate White House advisers. And while it is obvious that the
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executive branch would benefit from such a holding, the judicial branch and even the
legislative branch would benefit as well.
A. Courts Should Reject Both Proposed Arguments
Both the White House (via the Justice Department) and the U.S. House (through
the Judiciary Committee) presented arguments in the Miers case that are likely the
same basic arguments that will be raised in future lawsuits involving executive
privilege. For purposes of analysis, this Article ignores threshold issues such as
standing and justiciability, focusing on the merits of executive-privilege assertions.
1. Congressional Arguments
Congress makes the obvious arguments. Regarding the Judiciary Committee, the
House argues that a person must appear before a committee in order to assert
privilege.296 It argues that there is no immunity for former presidential aides,297
because the President himself is not immune from testifying.298 Assuming arguendo
there is immunity, it is still not absolute immunity. Congressional Democrats also
alleged in Miers that replacing federal prosecutors potentially undermines criminal
investigations.299 The Committee claimed that these hearings were investigative of
whether corrective legislation was required.300
Several of these arguments are flawed or incorrect. Justice Jackson once said in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Steel Seizure Case, that, like those seeking
to defeat executive privilege assert in recent litigation, “[p]residential claim to a
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”301 That
case was inapposite in Miers (though it would seem relevant to a President asserting
that a czar exercising executive power need not testify before Congress). In
Youngstown, President Truman was making legislation by executive fiat in ordering
the Secretary of Commerce to seize steel production facilities; he was merging both
the legislative and executive powers. Making legislation requires the cooperation of
both elected branches.302 Here, the question concerns the prerogatives of the
executive vis-à-vis Congress; rather than a cooperative issue and a question of
enacting policy, it is an adversarial issue with no policy elements.
The Committee asserted that Mr. Bolten and Ms. Miers must comply with the
subpoena, and argues that the idea of any executive official not being subject to such
296
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subpoenas is without precedent. Those who note that during the early years of
republic congressional subpoenas were not second-guessed by the judiciary also
acknowledge that this practice of acquiescing to legislative inquiries was inherited
from the English system,303 a system wherein Parliament is supreme.304 Thus, the
system we inherited was one in which the executive was always required to answer
to the legislature.
2. White House Arguments
The true party-in-interest in executive-privilege cases is the President of the
United States. The named parties in the Miers suit were Harriet Miers and Joshua
Bolten. All litigation on their behalf was handled by the Department of Justice. Yet
these suits concern the President’s use of his constitutional authority, the executive
privilege at issue is held by the President and asserted by the President, and each of
the defendants and potential defendants are being targeted solely for their interaction
and relationship with the President. Therefore, the true party here is the President.
The White House argued such cases are nonjusticiable. It argued that the courts
lack jurisdiction because the House lacks standing to sue.305 It also argued, assuming
arguendo that there is standing, the House lacks a cause of action.306 Another
alternative argument was that, assuming there is a cause of action, the court should
refuse to decide this matter and should decline to exercise jurisdiction on equitable
grounds.307
Each of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article, except that issues of
standing and causes of action were touched upon earlier to set the context for the
reluctance to adjudicate that the judiciary should show on executive privilege clashes
between coordinate branches. Regarding the political question doctrine, where
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction because the conflict is of a nature that ought to
be decided by the two political branches,308 the D.C. Circuit has held that “neither
the political question doctrine nor any close adaptation thereof is appropriate where
neither of the conflicting political branches has a clear and unequivocal
constitutional title, and it is or may be possible to establish an effective judicial
settlement.”309 Because executive privilege is derived from implied—not express—
constitutional powers on both sides, there is no unequivocal constitutional title. This
is consistent with Supreme Court guidance that “the presence of constitutional issues
with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political
303
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question doctrine.”310 Thus, the political question doctrine does not apply in the
D.C. Circuit, though it would pose a question of first impression for the Supreme
Court.
On the merits, the White House argued in Miers that senior aides should be
absolutely immune from congressional subpoenas, such that the adviser need not
appear before the Committee.311 This argument may have some force from a
separation-of-powers perspective, but any White House “claim of absolute immunity
from compelled congressional process . . . is without any support in the case law.”312
Instead, it is for the courts to determine the scope and application of executive
privilege.313 Consistent with longstanding precedent, current case law requires that
executive privilege questions be resolved on the return of the subpoena and does not
allow the executive branch to simply disregard subpoenas on a claim of immunity
from testifying.314 The Miers district court thus left question-specific assertions of
executive privilege as the only acceptable application of the privilege in
circumstances such as these. The court noted with seeming approval that other
witnesses in the recent investigations employed this question-by-question assertion
of executive privilege, citing the example of one Bush White House political
director.315
Yet the executive has often asserted this position of absolute immunity from
judicial process. Administrations of both parties therefore maintain that senior
White House officials—those that directly advise the President—should always be
covered by executive privilege and not even be required to testify before
Congress.316 (Such an assertion has never been made by an operational manager
whose offices are situated in the White House without congressional authorization,
leaving previous arguments inapposite regarding “czars.”) Such senior advisers are
immune because they are essentially alter egos of the President, as the Clinton
Justice Department argued.317 Therefore, as far as the law is concerned, when the
President deliberates with such a senior adviser, he is essentially talking to himself.
Additionally, the Reagan Justice Department argued that executive branch
officials who refuse to testify due to a presidential assertion of executive privilege
cannot be prosecuted for contempt either by a federal prosecutor or Congress.318 But
immunity from criminal prosecution is one thing, whereas immunity from civil
discovery pursuant to court order is another. Although the courts have not
310
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definitively spoken on the question, the Clinton Justice Department considered the
question. “Subjecting a senior presidential advisor to the congressional subpoena
power would be akin to requiring the President himself to appear before Congress on
matters relating to the performance of his constitutionally assigned executive
functions.”319 The Justice Department under President George W. Bush adopted that
position verbatim.320
The Supreme Court has held that the President is absolutely immune from
damages for his official actions,321 while holding that top White House advisers only
enjoy qualified immunity from damages for their official actions.322 This does not
dispositively prove that such presidential advisers do not share presidential immunity
from testifying, as there may be a rationale for fully transferring presidential
protection regarding deliberations but not regarding damages, but it nonetheless cuts
against the idea of presidential advisers wielding comprehensive protection against
compelled testimony.323 Although there is now a D.C. District precedent that such
aides do not enjoy comprehensive protection,324 the question remains open for the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Finally, the White House argues that courts should not decide these claims
because adjudication “would inexorably alter the separation of powers and forever
change how the political branches deal with each other.”325 That argument fails for
the reasons set forth in Part V.B below.
B. Superior Alternative Approach for the Recent Controversies
The courts should not accept either set of arguments. The courts should reject
White House contentions that executive-privilege claims are not justiciable, finding
instead that under circumstances such as those described in Miers, Congress has
standing and such assertions of privilege are also in all other respects justiciable.
The courts should thus reach the merits of the case. In reaching the merits, the
courts should reject Congress’s arguments when senior White House advisers are
conversing with the President on his express constitutional powers, not limited to
commander-in-chief. But as the other factors considered above are introduced, such
as matters involving so-called czars that exercise executive authority without express
congressional authorization, Congress should start to be able to overcome assertions
of privilege and perform congressional oversight duties.
The D.C. Circuit has determined that “the resolution of conflict between the
coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an opportunity for a
319
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constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes the functioning of our
system.”326 Such opportunities may arise in the coming years. The courts should
issue a clear ruling that conversations between the President and members of his
advisory White House staff concerning the exercise of an Article II power expressly
granted to the President are privileged, and it is difficult to posit a justification so
compelling that it could override the President’s interest in confidentiality. But in
many other circumstances such confidentiality becomes less central to the
constitutional scheme, and eventually tips in favor of Congress as the people’s
representatives to hold the President accountable.
The judiciary should apply the rationale employed by the Gravel Court to White
House advisers,327 so long as those advisers are truly advisory, as they serve in the
White House Office in the same fashion that congressional staffers serve in the
members’ offices. Both act as alter egos of the elected official in whose office they
serve. In the alternative, White House staff of senior rank should be held alter egos
of the President regarding presidential action. Even more narrowly, such staff could
alternatively be found to be alter egos when they are conversing with the President.
At a minimum, White House aides of senior rank should be considered alter egos of
the President regarding conversations they have directly with the President if those
conversations concern the President’s use of an Article II power, as such
conversations go to the core exercise of the President’s power by conferring with
extensions of his constitutional office regarding the discharge of his constitutional
functions. The courts could even narrow such a holding further yet, by limiting its
scope to situations where there is no substantial showing of criminal wrongdoing.
This would obviously not help in situations where credible criminal allegations are
implicated. Such a provision would leave intact the case law from the Watergate
era, while reducing the likelihood of threats of litigation springing from unremitting
and unending investigations of the executive branch during times of heightened
partisan tension.
The courts should attach special importance to presidential deliberations
regarding an Article II power. The brevity of Article II’s text leaves a great deal
open to inference and interpretation. Executive orders that carry the force of law but
that codify policy in a manner similar to statutes raise questions as to the limits of
unilateral executive policymaking. The President entering into executive agreements
with other nations,328 without either submitting the agreement to the Senate as a
treaty that requires a two-thirds vote for ratification,329 aggressively asserts the
President’s foreign policy powers. Certainly there are aspects of the modern
administrative state that can raise those concerns. But there are also core powers
committed to the President—and to him alone—by the Constitution. Although the
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Court has at times not focused on that fact as a rigid basis for decision,330 a growing
emphasis on textualism in recent years should lead to a robust protection of the
President’s confidentiality in discussing express Article II actions with his senior
advisory staff, just as this emphasis might call for a reexamination of various other
areas of recent government practice that might be at odds with the constitutional
framework.
Only one rationale is obvious as to why the White House would not advocate for
this position and instead encourage the court to not reach the merits of the case: the
White House is not confident it would receive an outcome better than the status quo.
The White House is concerned that in addressing the merits of executive privilege
cases, the judiciary will allow for a requirement that the White House senior staff to
provide at least some information. Alternatively, the White House could fear that
the courts would fashion a new framework or rule of law, and this framework could
be even less desirable to the White House than the status quo. Or perhaps the White
House would be compelled to provide the information to a judge for an in camera
inspection for the judge to determine what is privileged. Thus, in the spirit of the
popular axiom of “better the devil you know,” the White House would rather the
courts not engage in executive privilege.
But this approach is mistaken. Recent lawsuits over executive privilege have
become acrimonious and degrade relations between the political branches. If not
clearly resolved by the judiciary, such suits will only encourage more litigation to
the point that it would become a tiresome next step that could be expected whenever
a future President attempts to assert confidentiality. By reaching the merits of a case
involving these controversies, the courts can restore appropriate balance of
protection for presidential deliberations with Congress’s need for information to
perform oversight, regardless of party. This could in turn help generate goodwill
between the political branches essential for optimal interbranch relations as
contemplated by the Constitution’s tripartite framework.
The lawsuits discussed in this Article from the George W. Bush presidency were
a continuation of various cases litigated during the Clinton presidency. The same
could now happen with the Obama presidency. These overlapping scandals eroded
executive privilege.331 The Court rejected any “protective function privilege” for
Secret Service agents that until that point had been theorized as an aspect of
executive privilege.332
White House staff protections—including executive
privileges involving the White House Counsel’s Office—were diminished.333
Commenting on the narrowing of executive privilege, Professor Turley expressed
concern as to how these cases weakened the presidency.334 To be fair, two
distinctive differences between Clinton’s assertions of executive privilege and those
of earlier administrations were that Clinton freely asserted the privilege and did so
330
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even for unofficial matters, whereas prior Presidents were reluctant to assert it and
even then did so only regarding official actions.335 Professors Jonathan Turley and
Nelson Lund credit part of this damage to Bernard Nussbaum, Clinton’s first White
House counsel, for failing to maintain proper boundaries between President
Clinton’s official activities versus private activities by working on matters that
stemmed from the President’s personal matters.336 This left the courts to draw lines
excluding such private activities from executive-privilege protection. But they were
nonetheless executive privilege cases. And the defeat of several executive-privilege
assertions by President Clinton saddled future administrations with a disadvantage
against congressional investigators.337
Such controversies, if they bear fruit for an opposition Congress, will only
continue this aggravation between the branches and further embolden a Congress
controlled by the opposition party to push the envelope on investigatory limits. Even
if no illegalities are involved, it is “inherent in the nature of presidential
communications that they often could prove embarrassing if publicly released: that is
a fundamental reason for the very existence of the privilege.”338
Of course, when Congress is entitled to the information in question, then
aggressive congressional action ought to result in the acquisition of the sought-after
material. And all this plays out on a political stage, where both the President and his
congressional opponents choose to tackle the rigorous challenges of political life in
our democratic system. It should be no surprise to any student of American politics
that “[a] President’s political adversaries can be expected to seek presidential
communications and executive branch deliberative information for the very reason
that public disclosure might prove embarrassing to the President.”339
C. All Three Government Branches—Including Congress—Will Benefit from not
Allowing Congress to Be Involved with Executive Branch Appointment Decisions
It would go without saying—except that it must be said in a law review article—
that a correct application of executive privilege in a case such as Miers would benefit
the executive branch. Upholding executive privilege, as this Article advocates,
would strengthen the position of the President vis-à-vis Congress, by making
confidential private conversations with White House advisory officials regarding
how the President should use his appointment power. What is less likely to be
considered—but equally true—is that the judiciary will benefit as well, as will
Congress.
The benefit to the judiciary is obvious. If the courts do not welcome such suits
that require consideration of individualized assertions of executive privilege, the
D.C. District and D.C. Circuit do not run the risk of regularly facing cases that
require extensive discovery into executive branch conversations, each of which must
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go through a number of stages before it can be considered by a court. Furthermore,
each would then require a detailed process with the presiding judge determining
which parts, if any, are covered by executive privilege, and such determinations
could constitute complex fact patterns. Upholding clear executive privilege rules
that do not require frequent judicial involvement would minimize courts’ decision
costs, conserving scarce judicial resources.
The alternative, allowing suits to proceed in a manner that requires substantial
judicial involvement, would be a burden to the courts. If a court allows a subpoena
requiring a presidential adviser to appear to be enforced—leaving executive
privilege to be asserted on a per-question basis during the course of the committee
hearing—the only way a federal judge can then rule on the propriety of any given
assertion of the privilege is after (1) the official refuses to answer on the grounds that
the answer is privileged, (2) the chairman rejects the assertion and orders the witness
to answer, (3) the official flatly refuses to comply, (4) the chairman finds the official
in contempt, (5) the full committee votes (possibly along party lines) to sustain the
chairman’s finding, (6) the matter is referred to the full House, (7) the full body
votes for a contempt citation, (8) the Speaker certifies the contempt citation and
refers it to federal prosecutors, (9) the Justice Department declines to prosecute, (10)
the House authorizes a civil suit, (11) the authorized member of the House files suit,
and (12) the parties argue before a federal judge whether executive privilege was
properly asserted. After the assertion, the judge (13) conducts an in camera
inspection, (14) gives the executive an opportunity to submit more specified claims
if certain material is not considered privileged, and then (15) supervises the release
of whatever is still held not to be privileged. That is quite a burden for each
assertion of privilege. And that burden should serve to discourage unnecessary
litigation.
Thus, courts should be reluctant to address claims between the coequal political
branches, because leaving the branches to work out differences “positively promotes
the functioning of our [constitutional] system.”340 The Constitution “contemplates a
more restricted role for Article III courts” in resolving interbranch disputes.341 But
there must be limits to such reluctance. Leaving disputes to the political branches
for resolution works—except when it doesn’t. And then what? Once one or both
branches escalate a situation into one that impairs the proper functioning of one or
both branches, then the courts should restore the proper constitutional balance if the
controversy turns on a constitutional question, as it does regarding executive
privilege.
The less obvious benefit is that such a holding would also benefit Congress. The
“Pottery Barn Rule,” as Secretary of State Colin Powell articulated it regarding the
U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, was “You break it, you own it.”342 With action
comes responsibility. Tort law includes the rule that, absent a special relationship, a
person owes no duty to act for the benefit of another, but if they choose to act, they
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will then be held accountable if they act negligently.343 The same holds true for
elected leaders. If an elected official has no hand in an action that goes awry, then
the public usually gives him a free hand to condemn it. But if the elected leader has
knowledge of a matter, then often he will be held to account by the electorate for his
use (or lack thereof) of that knowledge and can suffer consequences if matters
concerning that knowledge go badly.
Congress should be reluctant to welcome this level of accountability. Looking at
the Miers case, if Congress insists on being able to access presidential deliberations
on appointments, Congress will share accountability with the President when one of
those appointees fails.
The President makes approximately six thousand
appointments through the White House Office of Presidential Personnel.344 This
includes appointing 94 U.S. attorneys,345 the political office at the center of the Miers
case. A U.S. attorney’s office typically requires forty to eighty employees.346
Another entity dealing with staffing, the White House Office of Personnel
Management, had a budget of over $331 million in Fiscal Year 2008.347 In order to
protect its own interests, Congress would have to conduct due diligence into many
applicants to assess whether that person poses a risk of not performing his duties
well. As such possibly-problematic appointees are identified, Congress must lodge
objections with the White House against the appointment. In order to conduct such
due diligence, Congress would have to create its own staff to conduct its own
investigations. There would doubtless be redundancies between various oversight
committees, as each committee could have different criteria for suspect nominees.
And individual members may also want a staff person specifically dedicated to
White House appointments, as any member may be unwilling to place his political
interests in the hands of the committee chairman’s vetting team. Congress would be
much better served by not engaging in that process at all and preserving its ability to
simply condemn the White House for incompetence whenever a presidential
appointee embarrasses the administration.
The Senate shares accountability for performance, but not for the decision to
appoint. In confirmation, the Senate determines whether the nominee is fit for the
office. It does not inquire into what conversations the President had or what
considerations motivated him to put forward that particular nominee. Therefore,
neither house of Congress has dealt with this level of accountability to date.
Yet on countless other issues, congressional oversight is extremely important to
hold an administration to account and thereby encourages the executive branch to
focus its efforts on faithfully serving the American people through a conscientious
performance of administrative duties. Those who hold congressional office have
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taken an office that is demanding; thus, members of Congress must exercise
appropriate oversight regardless of political risk.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most controversies between Congress and the White House over information are
decided more by politics than by law, and so a settlement is usually reached favoring
the party with the public wind to its back.348 Questions of law should not be decided
in that fashion. Therefore, the reach and scope of executive privilege should be
settled by the courts in such situations, so that the President’s power is not impaired
whenever the political wind is in the President’s face and at his opponents’ backs, or
the President is inappropriately shielded when political tides flow in his favor.
While the best outcome in any interbranch dispute is the political branches
reaching a settlement, “such compromise may not always be available, or even
desirable.”349 It is not desirable where it sets a precedent that degrades one of the
three branches of government. If one branch of government demands something to
which it is not constitutionally entitled and that the Constitution has fully vested in a
coequal branch, the vested branch should not be required to negotiate on the
question. Negotiation usually involves compromise. This negotiation would often
result in one branch needing to cede to the other, encouraging additional
unconstitutional demands in the future. Though this may perhaps be a quicker route
to a resolution, it disrupts the constitutional balance in government. As the Supreme
Court has recently explained, “‘convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.’”350
President Reagan declared that “you aren’t President; you are temporarily
custodian of an institution, the Presidency. And you don’t have any right to do away
with any of the prerogatives of that institution, and one of those is executive
privilege. And this is what was being attacked by the Congress.”351 Thus, any White
House has the obligation to fight to protect executive privilege, and the courts should
draw the line to preserve that constitutional prerogative. Likewise, there are times
when it is the President who is refusing to give Congress its due under the
Constitution, where Congress must assert its prerogatives for future generations.
Conversely, where confidentiality is not warranted, courts must ensure public
disclosure and accountability.
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